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Consumer Attention Allocation and Firm Strategies 
Qitian Ren 
Nowadays consumers can easily access to vast amounts of product information before making a 
purchase. Yet, limitations on the ability to process information force consumers to make choices 
regarding the subjects to which they pay more or less attention. In this dissertation, I study how a 
consumer optimally allocates attention to various product information before making a purchase 
decision and how a seller should design the marketing strategies taking into account the 
consumer's attention allocation decision. I find that either a consumer engages in “confirmatory” 
search under which she searches more information that favors her prior belief or the consumer 
engages in “disconfirmatory” search under which she searches more information that disfavors 
her prior belief. In particular, the consumer conducts more disconfirmatory search when the 
information processing cost is low, while she conducts more confirmatory search when the cost 
is high. This suggests that “confirmatory bias” widely studied in psychology literature could be 
optimal behavior coming out of people optimizing attention to different types of information, 
especially when people has high information processing costs. Furthermore, a consumer's 
purchase likelihood may vary with her information processing cost in a non-monotonic way, 
depending on the consumer's prior belief and the utilities of buying a matched product and a 
mismatched product. Moreover, I show that when more information becomes available or credible, 
the consumer would increase attention to negative information when the prior utility of the product 
is high but she would increase attention to positive information when the prior utility is low. In 
terms of seller's strategies, I find that when the consumer has a low information processing cost, 
the seller would charge a relatively high price such that consumers always process information; 
but when the consumer has a high information processing cost, the seller would charge a relatively 
low price such that consumers purchase the product without any learning. The optimal price and 
profit would first decrease and then increase in consumer's information processing cost. In 
addition, offering the return policy induces the consumer to pay more attention to positive 
information and less attention to negative information, and the seller would offer the return policy 
except when the consumer has a very high information processing cost. Finally, when a seller can 
influence the information environment, he would have a lower incentive to suppress the negative 
information when the consumer has a lower prior belief about product fit. Moreover, a higher 
information processing cost for a consumer would increase or decrease a seller's incentive to 
suppress the negative information in the environment, depending on whether the seller can adjust 
the product price and whether the consumer has a high or low prior belief. Interestingly, the seller 
may charge a lower price when he can fully control the information environment than when he 
can not. 
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Consumers often acquire and process relevant product information to reduce uncertainty
about a product's fit before making a purchase decision. For instance, they may inspect
the product, read product descriptions and reviews, talk to friends, etc. Yet, limitations on
the ability to process information force consumers to make choices regarding the subjects
to which they pay more or less attention. In particular, consumers may make two types
of mistakes about purchase: (1) Buying a product that they should have not bought and
(2) rejecting a product that they should have bought. Processing information reduces the
chance of making these mistakes and how consumers allocate attention to various product
information determines which type of mistake is reduced more. To be more specific, a
product may have several potentially good and bad aspects. Some information such as a
negative product review is more concerned with the potential drawbacks of a product, while
other information such as a positive product review is more concerned with the potential
benefits. On the one hand, paying attention to the first type of information (referred to
as negative information) allows the consumer to realize some serious drawbacks when the
product does not fit her,1 thereby reducing the mistake of buying a mismatched product; on
the other hand, paying attention to the second type of information (referred to as positive
information) allows the consumer to find out some good aspects of the product when the
product fits her, thereby reducing the mistake of not buying a matched product. However,
due to the costs of processing information, the consumer has to trade off these two types of
mistakes by allocating attention to positive and negative product information.
For example, suppose a consumer is considering whether or not to buy an electric car.
A priori, an electric car may save the consumer a lot of money on gas (potential benefit)
but it may be hard for the consumer to charge the car (potential drawback). The consumer
needs to process further information to reduce uncertainty about those aspects. However,
1In my dissertation, I refer to the consumer as she and to the seller as he.
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since processing information is costly for the consumer, she has to decide how much time
and efforts to spend on investigating each aspect respectively. In particular, suppose the
consumer chooses an information processing strategy under which she spends a lot of time
and efforts on investigating the potential benefit but spends little time on the potential
drawback. In this case, if the electric car indeed fits the consumer (e.g., it indeed saves
the consumer a lot of money on gas and it is not very hard for the consumer to charge
the car), then the consumer is very likely to find out that the product would fit her under
such information processing strategy. This would increase the consumer's willingness to pay
and reduces the mistake of not buying a matched product; but if the electric car does not
fit (e.g., the charging station is far away from where the consumer lives and thus charging
an electric car is very hard for this consumer), then she may not be able to find out such
serious drawback because she pays little attention to it, thereby leading to a high risk of
buying a mismatched product. Similarly, suppose the consumer instead chooses an opposite
information processing strategy under which she pays a lot of attention to the potential
drawback but pays little attention to the potential benefit. Under such strategy, she would
instead have a low chance of mistakenly buying an electric car when it does not fit her, but
she suffers from a high risk of mistakenly rejecting it when it indeed fits her.
Consider another example in which a consumer is reading the online product reviews of
a product. If the consumer pays more attention to positive product reviews than negative
ones, she is more likely to make a mistake of buying a mismatched product because she
may not be able to find out its drawbacks mentioned in those negative reviews. However, if
she instead pays more attention to negative reviews than positive ones, then she is instead
more likely to reject a matched product because she may ignore some good aspects of the
product.
The examples above show that the consumer's attention allocation decision directly de-
termines the quality of her purchase decision, motivating the consumer to optimize her
attention on various product information. To understand how a consumer allocates atten-
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tion, I develop in Chapter 3 an analytical model based on rational inattention framework
(Sims, 2003) in which the decision maker's attention allocation decision is captured by her
choice of signal structure and cost of information is measured using information theory
(Shannon 1948). To be more specific, I assume that there exist two possible states: either
the product fits a consumer (i.e., the utility of the product is above the consumer's reserva-
tion price and thus the consumer should buy the product) or it does not fit (i.e., the utility
of the product is below the consumer's reservation price and thus she should not buy the
product). The consumer does not know the match state ex-ante, but information search
generates a signal based on which a consumer can update her belief about product fit, and
the consumer's attention allocation decision determines the signal accuracy, referred to as
signal structure, under both fit and not fit states. In particular, when the consumer
pays relatively more attention to positive information than negative information, the sig-
nal is relatively more accurate under fit state than under not fit state, and vice versa.
Therefore, the consumer's attention allocation decision is captured by her choice of signal
structure, and she chooses the optimal signal structure by trading off the value and cost of
information, where the value of a particular signal structure is quantified by the expected
utility the consumer can obtain via making decisions based on the signal and the cost of a
particular signal structure is quantified using the mutual information metric in information
theory (Shannon 1948).
I obtain closed-form solution for optimal attention allocation decision and find that a
consumer engages in either confirmatory search or disconfirmatory search. Under con-
firmatory search the consumer searches more information that favors her prior belief about
product fit (e.g., paying more (less) attention to positive information than negative infor-
mation under a high (low) prior belief), while under disconfirmatory search the consumer
instead searches more information that disfavors her prior belief (e.g., paying more (less)
attention to negative information than positive information under a high (low) prior belief).
In particular, the consumer may do more disconfirmatory search when she has a low infor-
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mation processing cost, but she would do more confirmatory search when she has a high cost.
Note that the confirmatory search resonates with the confirmation bias phenomenon widely
studied in the psychology literature (e.g., Nickerson 1998) which experimentally shows that
people tend to bias their information search by seeking more evidence that favors their prior
beliefs in both judgment and decision making contexts. However, in contrast to the psycho-
logical explanations that typically perceive the confirmation bias as an inferential error of
human reasoning (e.g., Evans, 1989, p.41), our result suggests that the confirmatory bias
could be optimal behavior coming out of people optimizing attention to different types of
information, especially when people has high cognitive limitations and thus high informa-
tion processing costs. Moreover, since a consumer's attention allocation pattern may switch
from disconfirmatory search to confirmatory search as her information processing cost be-
comes higher, her purchase likelihood thus may vary with the information processing cost
in a non-monotonic way. For example, depending on her prior belief and other factors, the
consumer's purchase likelihood may first increase and then decrease with her information
processing cost, or it may first decrease and then increase. I will discuss these cases in
details later in Chapter 3. Besides, there often exists some uncertainty that is not reducible.
For example, some product information may not be available for consumers to process or
it is not credible. Therefore, I further study how this irreducible uncertainty influences
the consumer's attention allocation. Interestingly, I find that as more information becomes
available or credible, if the prior utility of a product is high, then the consumer would in-
crease attention to negative information and thus the purchase likelihood decreases; but if
the prior utility is low, then the consumer would increase attention to positive information
and the purchase likelihood increases.
Understanding the consumer's attention allocation decision is also important for a seller.
For example, a seller may be able to influence the consumer's attention allocation decision
by making product information harder or easier for consumers to process. But until a
seller understands how a consumer allocates attention, it is not clear a priori that whether
4
increasing or decreasing a consumer's information processing cost would induce the consumer
to process relatively more positive information. Furthermore, some of the seller's marketing
strategies can also influence the consumer's attention allocation decision. For example, if
the seller charges a lower price or offers a return policy that allows the consumer to return
mismatched product, then the disutility of buying a mismatched product becomes lower.
This may induce the consumer to allocate more attention on the positive information. Given
this, will the consumer's flexible attention allocation make the seller charge a higher or lower
price? Is it always optimal for a seller to offer the return policy? In addition, a seller may also
affect the consumer's attention allocation by choosing how much and which information to
be available or unavailable for the consumer to process, which is referred to as information
design. For example, a software company can decide how many and which features are
available for consumers to try in its free trial, and a seller may also suppress the negative
product reviews on the reviews sites so that the consumers are less likely to find out the
potential drawbacks of the product. The questions is: when dose the seller have a high
incentive to suppress the negative information and when does he have a low incentive? To
answer the questions above about firm strategies, in Chapter 4, I turn attention to study
how a seller charges the price, offers return policy and designs the information environment,
taking into account the consumer's attention allocation decision.
I obtain several interesting implications of consumer attention allocation on firm strate-
gies. First, in terms of pricing, with low information processing cost, consumers have high
incentives to process information about product fit, and if they do process and receive a
positive signal, their willingness to pay becomes higher. This induces the seller to charge a
high price such that consumers always process information (learning-promoted strategy).
In particular, a higher price motivates consumers to increase attention to negative informa-
tion of a product and decrease attention to positive information, and this effect becomes
stronger under a higher information processing cost. Therefore, as information processing
cost becomes higher, the demand sensitivity to price increases and thus the seller has to
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charge a lower price. However, with high enough information processing cost, consumers
have low incentives to process information, and thus it becomes more profitable for the
seller to charge a low price so that consumers always buy the product without costly search
and learning (learning-prevented strategy). Under this strategy, a higher information pro-
cessing cost reduces the consumer's incentive to learn and thus allows the seller to charge
a higher price without inducing the consumer to process information. Overall, the seller
prefers the learning-promoted pricing strategy when the consumer has a low information
processing cost but prefers the learning-prevented strategy when the consumer has a high
information processing cost. Therefore, the optimal price and profit first decrease and then
increase with information processing cost.
In addition to pricing, a seller often offers return policy which allows the consumer to
return mismatched product. Regarding such a return policy, I find that offering return policy
would induce consumers to pay more attention to positive information and less attention to
negative information, and the seller should offer a return policy except when information
processing cost is very high. Specifically, when the information processing cost is high, the
seller prefers learning-prevented pricing strategy under which the seller discourages the
consumer from learning. In this case, offering a return policy further reduces the consumer's
learning incentive, which allows the seller to charge a higher price. However, when the
information processing cost is very high, this price increasing effect of return policy is small
and cannot offset the demand decreasing effect (the demand decreases under return policy
because the consumer can always return the mismatched product), and thus offering a return
policy in this case would reduce the firm's profit. Overall, the seller prefers offering return
policy when the information processing cost is not very high.
Finally, when a seller can design the information environment by choosing how much
information and which information to be available for consumers to process, I find that a
lower prior belief about product fit hold by the consumer decreases the seller's incentive
to suppress the negative information in the environment. Briefly speaking, a lower prior
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belief motivates the consumer to pay relatively more attention to negative information than
positive one, forcing the seller to guarantee enough negative information in the environment.
Otherwise, the information search would not be useful for the consumer and she would thus
not start to process any information at all, which is often bad for the seller. Besides, I
also find that a higher information processing cost would increase or decrease the seller's
incentive to suppress negative information, depending on whether the seller can adjust the
product price and whether the consumer has a high or low prior belief. Interestingly, the
seller may charge a lower price when it can fully design the information environment than
when it can not. This is because a lower price can increase the consumer's incentive of
processing information, allowing the seller to further suppress the negative information to
increase the consumer's purchase likelihood.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I discuss related literature
on consumer search. In Chapter 3, I present the consumer attention allocation model and
analyze the optimal attention allocation decision by the consumer. In Chapter 4, I study
firm's marketing strategies taking into account the consumer's attention allocation decision.
Finally, I make conclusions in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 2: Related Literature
2.1 Consumer Search
The search cost and its implications on firm's strategies have been extensively studied in
literature. In a large part of this literature, consumers pay a fixed cost to learn: lowest price
(e.g., Diamond 1971, Stahl 1989), quality information (e.g., Mayzlin and Shin 2011, Gardete
2013), best-fit alternative (e.g., Bakos 1997, Anderson and Renault 1999, Villas-Boas 2009)
or their own preferences (e.g., Guo and Zhang 2012). In these studies, consumers are either
assumed to learn perfectly by paying a fixed search cost or assumed to receive an informative
signal with exogenous precision.
Specifically, most of the early work in this literature focuses on consumer search for
price information and its implications on market. For example, Diamond (1971) provides
an extreme example about how consumer search for price influences the market, which is
called as the Diamond Paradox . There are two parts to the paradox. On the seller side,
as long as the consumers have a positive search cost, all firms set the monopoly price in
equilibrium regardless of the number of firms. On the consumer side, consumers do not
search. The basic intuition is that if some certain seller sets a price below the monopoly
price, then this seller always has an incentive to raise its price slightly by an amount smaller
than the search cost, because doing so would not induce any existing consumers of this seller
to leave in search of other firms' prices and the seller can get more margin from each existing
consumer. This incentive to raise price implies that all firms must charge the monopoly price
in equilibrium. Furthermore, consumers have no reason to search because they rationally
anticipate that all firms charge the same monopoly price. Therefore, Diamond's model is
a search model without search and it shows that even modest search costs can lead to a
market outcome that equilibrium prices are strikingly higher than marginal costs, which is
in contrast to the traditional economic model such as Bertrand (1883) where consumers are
perfectly informed about prices and firms charges a price equal to the marginal cost.
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Bridging the Diamond's monopoly pricing and Bertrand's marginal-cost pricing, Stahl
(1989) considers a sequential search model in which there are two types of consumers:
shoppers with zero search costs and non-shoppers with positive search costs. If the
fraction of shoppers tends to be one, almost all consumers in the market have a zero search
cost and thus they can easily discover the lowest price in the market, which motivates the
firms to undercut price intensively so that equilibrium prices approach the marginal cost
(Bertrand, 1883); However, if the fraction ofshoppers tends to be zero, then almost all
consumers in the market have a positive search cost and thus all firms will charge the
monopoly price for the reason I discussed earlier (Diamond, 1971). Moreover, Stahl (1989)
shows that equilibrium prices increase in the number of firms in the market. The intuition is
the following. As more and more competitors come to the market, firms in a mixed pricing
strategy equilibrium would have an smaller probability of being the cheapest seller and thus
have an incentive to charge higher prices.
Following the studies above about consumer search for price, later work in the consumer
search literature starts to investigate the case where the consumer searches for both price
and product fit information. This stream of research can be traced back to Bakos (1997)
who studies the role of buyer search costs in markets with differentiated product offerings.
He shows that when a consumer incurs a cost to search both price and fit, a lower search
cost can promote price competition and reduce the market power of sellers. However, if
searching for fit has a separate cost from searching for price, then a lower search cost for
fit would actually increase the prices and the sellers' profits. This is because with a lower
search cost for fit, the consumer can easily find a product with a better fit and thus can
easily become captive of the seller who offers a better fit, which increases the seller's market
power. Anderson and Renault (1999) also study the implications of consumer's costly search
for both price and fit on price competition in a differentiated market. They show that prices
may initially decrease with the degree of product differentiation. This is because more
product diversity induces the consumer to search more, leading to more competition. But if
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the product diversity becomes very high, firms would have a higher market power and charge
a higher price, and thus prices would increase with the degree of product differentiation.
Aside from pricing, some other work investigates the impact of consumer search on other
kinds of firm strategies. For example, Villas-Boas (2009) studies the impact of consumer
search on product line length and shows that the optimal number of products offered is
decreasing in the evaluation costs. Guo and Zhang (2012) studies optimal product line
design when consumers need to incur costly deliberation to uncover their valuations for
quality. They show that in order to invite the consumer to deliberate, a seller must maintain
quality dispersion and cut the price of the high-end product.
Unlike the above literature which investigates the firm's strategies in response to con-
sumer search, one stream of research focuses on characterizing the specific procedure of
consumer search. For instance, Weitzman (1979) characterizes the solution to the problem
of searching for the best alternative. The optimal strategy is an elementary reservation price
rule, where the reservation prices depends only on the features of that alternative. The se-
lection rule is to search next the unsampled alternative with highest reservation price. The
stopping rule is to terminate search whenever the maximum sampled reward is above the
reservation price of every unsampled altenative. Branco et al. (2012, 2016) considered a
gradual learning model in which consumers incur search costs to learn product attribute
information sequentially, and update the expected utility of the product at each search oc-
casion. The optimal stopping rule for the consumer consists of an upper bound (purchase
threshold) and a lowerbound (exit threshold) on the consumer's expected valuation. In
particular, when the consumer's expected valuation of the product hits the purchase thresh-
old, the consumer stops searching and purchases the product. When the expected valuation
hits the exit threshold, the consumer stops searching and does not purchase the product.
When the expected valuation is in between the two bounds, the consumer continues to
search and updates the expected utility of the product. Following Branco et al. (2012,
2016), Ke et al. (2016) further characterizes the consumer search for information on multi-
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ple products and the optimal search strategy is characterized by an optimal consideration
set and a purchase threshold structure. Specifically, a product is only considered for search
or purchase if it has a sufficiently high expected utility. Given multiple products in the con-
sumer 's consideration set, the consumer only stops searching for information and purchases
a product if the difference between the expected utilities of the top two products is greater
than some threshold.
Although the literature above recognizes the fact that people often needs to incur nontriv-
ial costs to process information, it does not investigate how people selectively pays attention
to various product information. As mentioned in Chapter 1, consumers may spend more
time and efforts on investigating the potentially good aspects of a product or spend more
time and efforts on investigating the potentially bad aspects (e.g., they may pay more or less
attention to positive customer reviews than negative reviews.). Such attention allocation
decision can be modeled by the rational inattention framework proposed by Sims (1998,
2006), which is discussed in the following section.
2.2 Rational Inattention
There is a vast amount of information that is in principle available to decision-makers
(e.g., consumers can easily obtain various product information through internet such as the
online customer reviews). However, due to limited attention, it is impossible for people
to attention to all of the information. Therefore, the idea of rational inattention is that
decision-makers have to decide how to optimally allocate their limited attention, specifically,
which information to attend to carefully, which information to pay less attention to, and
which information to ignore.
To implement the idea of rational inattention, Sims (1998, 2003, 2006) proposes to
model attention as an information flow and limited attention is formulated as an upper
bound on information flow. In the following, I introduce the general framework of rational
inattention problem proposed by Sims (1998, 2003, 2006). Generally speaking, a decision
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maker needs to choose an action a from a discrete or continuous choice set A and she has
a prior belief G about the state of the world denoted by xX which leads to the payoff
v(x, a) if the decision maker takes the action a. The decision maker observes a signal S on
the state, then updates her belief about the state based on the signal realization sS, and
finally chooses an action as a Bayesian expected utility maximizer. In particular, before
receiving the signal, the decision maker is able to choose an information-processing strategy
which determines the joint distribution of the signal and the state, f(x, s) (equivalently,
given some prior belief distribution G(X), an information-processing strategy determines
the conditional distribution f(x|s) or f(s|x)). To be consistent with the following chapters,
I consider here the discrete distribution case and thus the rational inattention problem can




















f(x|s) log(f(x|s)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
H(X|S)
≤ κ, (1)




v(x, a)f(x|s) is the maximum utility the consumer can obtain given
the decision maker receives a signal realization S = s, and κ is the maximum information
flow rate between X and S (the lower κ is, the less attention the decision maker has.). The
unique feature of rational inattention framework above is that it uses the information theory
(Shannon, 1948) to measure the rate of information flow as shown in (1). Therefore, I briefly
introduce information theory in the following and discuss its application in the context of
attention allocation. Before that, note that a closely related formulation (e.g., Mat¥jka and
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f(x, s) = G(x) all x,
where λ is the unit cost of processing one piece of information. This alternative for-
mulation implies that the decision maker can not only choose how to allocate his or her
attention but also choose how much information to process. In Chapter 3 and 4, I will use
this formulation to model the consumer's attention allocation.
Information Theory
The basic idea of information theory is to measure the rate of information flow as the
rate of uncertainty reduction. It therefore starts with a measure of uncertainty, called
entropy. Specifically, the term H(X) ≡ −∑
x
G(x) log(G(x)) is called the entropy of the
random variable X and is a measure of the uncertainty about the state of X based on the
prior belief G(X). The definition of entropy as a measure of uncertainty can be basically
derived from two intuitive axioms. One can perceive entropy as the average amount of
`surprise' associated with a set of probable events. Based on this, the two intuitive axioms
can be described as follows: (1) the less probable an event is (i.e., G(x) is small), the more
surprising when it occurs; (2) The amount of surprise of seeing two independent events
simultaneously should be the sum of the amounts of surprise of seeing each event separately.
These two axioms imply that the surprise of an event is proportional to log p(x), with the
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proportionality constant determined by the base of logarithms. 2 Now, averaging over all
events according to their respective probabilities, one can get the expression forH(X). Next,
the term H(X|S) is called conditional entropy of X given signal S and is a measure of the
uncertainty about the state of X given the information from signal S. Information reduces
uncertainty, and the mutual information ofX and S, denoted by I(X,S) ≡ H(X)−H(X|S),
is a measure of the reduction of uncertainty about the true state of X due to receiving the
signal S and it quantifies the amount of information contained in a signal S (Shannon,
1948). Note that one can show the following relationship:
I(X,S) ≡ H(X)−H(X|S) = H(S)−H(S|X), (3)
where H(S) ≡ −∑
s






The measure I(X,S) has some appealing properties. First, it is zero if and only if X and
S are independent, and it is always non-negative. Second, given a sequence of observations,
say on S1 and on S2, we would like the information about X in seeing S1, then S2 to be the
same as that in seeing S2, then S1. That is, I(X,S1)+I(X,S2|S1) = I(X,S2)+I(X,S1|S2).
It turns out that these simple properties are restrictive enough to leave us with only the
Shannon measure of mutual information.
Besides these intuitively appealing properties, the popularity of using mutual information
as the measure of information is justified by its central position in communications engineer-
ing. In particular, information is thought of as moving through a channel, in which one
enters input data, and output data emerges, possibly error ridden, and the Shannon mutual
information of two random variables (e.g., the input data and output data) is equivalent to
the expected length in bits of the code needed to generate one from the other. Consider a
simple example of drawing a 0 or 1 from a distribution with equal probability on the two
2The usual base for log is 2, which implies that the unit of information is bit, while, in the following
chapters, the base used is e, in which case the unit is called nat. Using a different log base does not
qualitatively change our results.
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values and sending it through a device such as a telegraph key. Suppose this device can
generate the output data from the input data without error, then we can eliminate all uncer-
tainty in the value of the draw by transmitting one bit of information (i.e., 0 or 1). Note












In addition to its central position in communication engineering, using mutual informa-
tion as information cost function can also be justified from the perspective of sequential
information sampling. Specifically, it is often quite realistic to assume that information is
acquired through a sequential sampling process (e,g Wald 1945). That is, a decision maker
sequentially observes signals at a cost and dynamically decides when to stop acquiring in-
formation. However, another way to model information acquisition is the static rational
inattention approach discussed above, where the information cost is simply a function of
the decision maker's prior and posterior belief measured by mutual information. Interest-
ingly, Morris and Strack (2017) show the equivalence of sequential sampling approach and
static approach. In particular, they show that mutual information cost function corresponds
to a flow cost (in the sequential sampling problem) which vanishes when the agent is close
to certain about the state. Furthermore, Hebert and Woodford (2017) find that for a par-
ticular family of flow information-cost functions in the sequential sampling problem, the
cost function for the equivalent static model is just the mutual information, which provides
foundations for rational inattention framework proposed by Sims (1998, 2003, 2006), that
do not rely on any analogy in communications engineering.
In terms of empirical support of using Shannon mutual information as information pro-
cessing cost, a number of recent empirical studies show that using Shannon's mutual infor-
mation to model the costs of processing information about different choices fits and predicts
observed choice data well (e.g., Cheremukhin et al. 2011, Dewan and Neligh 2017). For
instance, Cheremukhin et al. (2011) use data from a behavioral experiment to show that
people behave according to predictions of rational inattention theory: (1) They behave prob-
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abilistically and (2) pay less attention and are thus more prone to error when differences
between choice options are smaller. More interestingly, Dewan and Neligh (2017) determine
using data from lab experiments that among a variety of cost functions for information acqui-
sition used in theoretical studies (specifically, fixed cost, normal signals with linear precision
costs, and the mutual information cost function), the mutual information cost function is
the best fit for a large majority (over two-thirds) of their subjects. However, note that
although rational inattention theory find some empirical support, some studies also point
out that decision makers do not always behave in line with what rational inattention theory
predicts and thus some generalization of Shannon's mutual information is proposed and is
found to improve the fit of the subject behavior in experiments (e.g., Caplin and Dean, 2013
and Woodford, 2014). In neuro-economics, the entropy function from information theory is
used to quantify the amount of information in a neural population (and mutual information
is used as a metric of reduction of uncertainty to link stimuli and neural responses; Quiroga
and Panzeri 2009, Rolls and Treves 2011.).
Application of Rational Inattention
Rational inattention framework above has been applied to a variety of economic contexts
such as consumption-savings problems (e.g., Sims 2006, Luo 2008, Ma¢kowiak and Wieder-
holt 2015), rigid pricing (e.g., Ma¢kowiak and Wiederholt 2009, Mat¥jka 2016), invest-
ment decisions (Mondria 2010, Yang 2011), and discrete choice (Mat¥jka and McKay 2015).
Specifically, the rational inattention theory is initially applied to explain the inertial reac-
tion of economic agents to external economic information (e.g., Sims 2003, 2006, Luo 2008
and Ma¢kowiak and Wiederholt 2015). In particular, Ma¢kowiak and Wiederholt (2015)
finds that since aggregate technology shocks are much larger than monetary policy shocks,
decision-makers in firms choose to pay more attention to aggregate technology shocks than
to monetary policy shocks, and as a result, prices set by firms respond faster to aggregate
technology shocks than to monetary policy shocks. Interestingly, their model matches the
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faster response of the price level to aggregate technology shocks not only qualitatively, but
also quantitatively. Similarly, Ma¢kowiak and Wiederholt (2009) present a rational inat-
tention model in which price setting firms decide what to pay attention to, subject to a
constraint on information flow. They find that when idiosyncratic conditions are more vari-
able or more important than aggregate conditions, firms pay more attention to idiosyncratic
shocks than to aggregate shocks, and as a result, price responses to idiosyncratic shocks are
strong and quick whereas price responses to aggregate shocks are dampened and delayed.
Mat¥jka (2016) finds that since misjudging the input cost when it is low is more costly to the
seller than when it is high, so the seller pays more attention to shocks leading to low costs,
which then implies more flexible low prices and sales-like movements. More interestingly,
even when the input cost is continuously distributed, a rationally inattentive seller would
choose to price discretely, i.e., he sets up a price plan consisting of a few prices and charges
only one of them, in order to economize on his information capacity. This implies that prices
are likely to stay fixed when cost shocks are small.
When people are making investment decisions, they also need to allocate attention to
various information. For example, Mondria (2010) studies the attention allocation of port-
folio investors who choose the composition of their information subject to an information
flow constraint. In equilibrium investors choose to observe one linear combination of asset
payoffs as a private signal, and as a result, changes in one asset affect both asset prices,
leading to comovement of asset prices and the transmission of volatility shocks between two
assets. Yang (2011) shows that if players' investment decisions are strategic complementar-
ity, each player is willing to pay attention to information that her opponent pays attention
to, which enables players to acquire information that makes efficient coordination possible.
Individuals must often choose among discrete actions with imperfect information about
their payoffs. Before choosing, they have an opportunity to incur costs to learn about the
payoffs and thus in order to make a good choice, they need to decide how much information
to process and which information to pay more attention to and which information to pay
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less attention to. Interestingly, Mat¥jka and McKay (2015) show that a rationally inatten-
tive decision maker would choose an alternative probabilistically in line with a generalized
multinomial logit model, which depends both on the actions' true payoffs as well as on prior
belief.
In my dissertation, I apply the rational inattention framework to the context in which
the consumer searches product match information and then makes a purchase decision. In
particular, I examine how the consumer optimally allocates attention given her prior belief,
information processing cost and the credibility of information, and how a seller chooses the
marketing strategies taking into account the consumer's attention allocation decision.
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Chapter 3: Consumer Attention Allocation
3.1 Model
3.1.1 Attention Allocation as the Choice of Signal Structure
Consider a consumer who wants to determine whether or not she should buy the product,
i.e., whether a product matches her needs or not. Denote X ∈ {0, 1} as the binary state for
match. If X = 1, then the product fits and the consumer obtains utility U1 from purchasing
it (net of price); if X = 0, the product does not fit and the consumer obtains utility U0
from purchasing it (net of price). I assume that the utility of the outside option is 0 and
U0 < 0 < U1. The consumer does not know ex ante the value of state X but has a prior
belief about it denoted by q ≡ P (X = 1). I assume that the consumer would know the
value of state X after purchasing the product.
By processing information (e.g., inspecting the product, reading product descriptions
and reviews, talking to friends, etc.), the consumer receives a signal S ∈ {0, 1} based on
which the consumer can update her belief about the match state X. Specifically, if S = 1,
then the consumer receives a positive signal increasing her belief that the product fits (i.e.,
P (X = 1|S = 1) > q, where P (X = 1|S = 1) is the conditional probability that true state
X is 1 given the signal S is 1); if S = 0, then the consumer receives a negative signal
decreasing her belief about product fit (i.e., P (X = 1|S = 0) < q, where P (X = 1|S = 0)
is the conditional probability that true state X is 1 given the signal S is 0). Note that
one can interpret the signal S as the aggregation of all the pieces of information processed
by a consumer. To be more specific, a consumer may search both some pieces of positive
information (e.g., positive product reviews) and some pieces of negative information (e.g.,
negative reviews) during the whole information search, and if the aggregation of all such
processed information increases her belief about product fit, then I say that the consumer
receives a positive signal (i.e., S = 1); conversely, if the consumer's belief decreases, then I
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say that she receives a negative signal (i.e., S = 0).
Unlike the traditional consumer search literature discussed before, I allow the consumer
to flexibly choose the signal accuracy (referred to as signal structure) δ1 ≡ P (S = 1|X = 1)
and δ0 ≡ P (S = 0|X = 0), where δ1 is the probability of receiving a positive signal
given the product indeed fits (i.e., X = 1) and δ0 is the probability of receiving a negative
signal given the product does not fit (i.e., X = 0). Note that the consumer's attention
allocation decision determines the signal accuracy under both fit and not fit states.
Consider again the customer reviews example. If the consumer spends a lot of time and
efforts on reading the content of positive reviews but spends little time on negative ones,
then she is very likely to find out some good product features that matter to her when
the product indeed fits but she may not be able to find out some serious drawbacks when
the product does not fit. Therefore, under such attention allocation strategy, the signal
is relatively more accurate when the product indeed fits than when it does not fit (i.e.,
δ1 > δ0). Conversely, when the consumer pays more attention to the negative reviews than
positive ones, then the signal would be relatively more accurate when the product does
not fit than when it does (i.e., δ0 > δ1). Therefore, I formulate the consumer's attention
allocation decision as her choice of the signal structure δ1 and δ0. Without loss of generality,
I say that the consumer chooses δ1 > δ0 if she pays more attention to positive information
than negative information and chooses δ1 < δ0 otherwise. Note that although I do not
investigate how the consumer search information step by step, the consumer's choice of δ1
(i.e., P (S = 1|X = 1)) and δ0 (i.e., P (S = 0|X = 0)) uniquely determines her posterior
beliefs P (X = 1|S = 1) and P (X = 1|S = 0), which further determines a stopping rule
when the consumer searches information sequentially. Specifically, as I will discuss later,
the consumer would always buy the product when receiving S = 1 and would choose her
outside option when receiving S = 0. Therefore, when the consumer's posterior belief about
product fit is above P (X = 1|S = 1), she would stop searching and buy the product. When
it is below P (X = 1|S = 0), she would instead stop searching and choose her outside
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option. When it is between P (X = 1|S = 1)and P (X = 1|S = 0), the consumer would
continue searching and keep updating her belief after processing each piece of information.
As I mentioned earlier, under some conditions, the static rational inattention approach is
equivalent to the sequential sampling approach (e.g., Hebert and Woodford 2017, Morris
and Strack 2017)
Now I proceed to answer the following question: How would a consumer choose the
optimal signal structure? Intuitively, if the signal has high signal precision, then the con-
sumer can make a better decision based on the signal but more information is needed to be
processed, thus leading to higher costs of processing information. Therefore, the consumer
chooses the optimal signal structure by trading off the value and cost of processing infor-
mation. In the following, I first quantify the value of information, then quantify the cost of
information, and finally formulate the consumer's optimal attention allocation problem.
3.1.2 Value of Information
Since by definition a positive signal increases a consumer's belief about product fit and a
negative signal decreases it, the signal structure must satisfy δ1 + δ0 > 1 so that P (X =
1|S = 1) > q > P (X = 1|S = 0). Otherwise, if δ1+δ0 = 1, then the posterior belief is always
equal to the prior belief, i.e., P (X = 1|S = 1) = q = P (X = 1|S = 0), which implies that
the signal is uninformative. If δ1 + δ0 < 1, then P (X = 1|S = 1) < q < P (X = 1|S = 0),
which contradicts with the definitions of positive and negative signal. Therefore, the signal
received by the consumer must satisfy δ1 +δ0 > 1. I assume if the consumer does not process
information, then there is no signal to receive and the consumer's belief does not change.
Furthermore, note that different signal realizations must induce the consumer to take
different actions (i.e., the consumer purchases the product when receiving a positive signal
and chooses the outside option when receiving a negative signal). Otherwise, if both positive
and negative signal lead to the same action, then it must be always better off for the
consumer to directly choose that action without incurring any cost to process information.
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Accordingly, the value of information can be quantified by the expected utility EV that the
consumer can obtain by making decisions based on different signal realizations, as shown in
(4).
EV ≡ P (S = 1)(P (X = 1|S = 1)U1 + P (X = 0|S = 1)U0) (4)
Intuitively, with probability P (S = 1), the consumer's information search generates a
positive signal, inducing her to purchase the product of which the posterior utility is given
by P (X = 1|S = 1)U1 + P (X = 0|S = 1)U0 (with probability P (S = 0), the consumer's
information search generates a negative signal, inducing her to choose the outside option with
utility 0). EV increases with both δ1 and δ0 (i.e.,
dEV
dδ1




0), implying that the expected utility increases as the signal becomes more accurate. Note
that if the consumer processes no information, then the consumer evaluates the product
based on her prior belief and purchases it if and only if qU1 + (1− q)U0 ≥ 0.
3.1.3 Cost of Information
Since a particular information search strategy generates a particular signal for the consumer,
it is natural to investigate how much information is needed to be processed to obtain such a
signal. As discussed in Chapter 2, Shannon's information theory (Shannon 1948, Cover and
Thomas 2006) offers a micro-founded metric, called mutual information, that quantifies the
total amount of information needed to be processed to obtain a particular signal. According
to (3), the amount of information contained in the binary signal in our model is given by
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I(X,S) = −[qδ1 + (1− q)(1− δ0)] log[qδ1 + (1− q)(1− δ0)]
−[q(1− δ1) + (1− q)δ0] log[q(1− δ1) + (1− q)δ0] (5)
+q[δ1 log δ1 + (1− δ1) log(1− δ1)]
+(1− q)[δ0 log δ0 + (1− δ0) log(1− δ0)].
Given this metric, the cost of obtaining a signal S (i.e., the cost of processing information
to change beliefs about states from p(X) to p(X|S)) can be measured by λI(X,S), where
λ > 0 is the unit cost of processing one piece of information. If she has high limitations
on time and cognitive resources, then the unit cost λ is high; otherwise, it is low.3 Note
that this cost function λI(X,S) is a convex function of δ1 and δ0 (i.e., λ
d2I
dδ2i
> 0, i ∈
{0, 1}). Furthermore, if the consumer increases attention to one type of information, then




> 0, i, j ∈ {0, 1}). Finally, if the consumer pays much more attention to one type
of information than the other type of information, then it is marginally cheaper to increase





, i ∈ {0, 1}).
Ignoring some axiomatic properties, one can also use other meaningful metrics to quantify
the cost of processing information. For example, processing information also reduces on
average the variance of belief distribution. So the amount of information contained in a
signal S can also be intuitively quantified as the reduction of variance: P (X = 1)(1−P (X =
3To be more precise, I(X,S) is the minimum information that needs to be processed to obtain the signal
S with the given signal structure. In other words, this corresponds to the most efficient processing case.
However, consumers may not process information in the most efficient possible manner, perhaps because
she is not familiar with the product category. Suppose that when the minimum information needed to
be processed is I, the information that consumers actually process is ξI, ξ > 1. Suppose that the cost of





then rescale λξ to λ and thus the unit cost becomes larger if the consumer does not process information in
the most efficient manner.
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1)) − {P (S = 1)P (X = 1|S = 1)(1 − P (X = 1|S = 1)) + P (S = 0)P (X = 1|S =
0)(1 − P (X = 1|S = 0))}, where the first termP (X = 1)(1 − P (X = 1)) is the variance
of prior belief distribution and the second term is the average variance of posterior belief
distribution. Using this variance-based metric does not lead to closed-form solution but
numerical analysis shows that it would not change our main results qualitatively in the
following chapters.
3.1.4 Optimization Problem for Attention Allocation
The consumer trades off the value and cost of information. She may choose to not process
information at all. Alternatively, if she chooses to process information, then the signal
received by her must satisfy δ1 + δ0 > 1 (as discussed earlier) and she maximizes the net
expected utility of learning as follows:
EU∗ ≡ sup
δ1,δ0
P (S = 1)(P (X = 1|S = 1)U1 + P (X = 0|S = 1)U0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
value of information
− λI(X;S)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost of information
s.t. δ1 + δ0 > 1
=⇒ EU∗ ≡ sup
δ1,δ0
qδ1U1 + (1− q)(1− δ0)U0︸ ︷︷ ︸
value of information
− λI(X;S)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost of information
(6)
s.t. δ1 + δ0 > 1
I(X,S) is given in (5). In the following, I solve for the optimal signal structure chosen by
the consumer and analyze its implications on consumer's information search and purchase
behavior.
3.2 Analysis: Optimal Attention Allocation
Define k = −U0
λ
, l = U1−U0
λ
, q = 1−e
k
1−el and q =
1−e−k
1−e−l (where q ≤ q). The optimal signal
structure is given in the following proposition.
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Proposition 1 The following holds:
1. If q ≤ q, the consumer processes no information and does not buy the product.
2. For q < q < q, δ∗1 and δ
∗













1− e−l . (7)




3. If q ≥ q, the consumer processes no information and buys the product.
Proof: See appendix.
When the prior belief is either very high (i.e., q ≥ q) or very low (i.e., q ≤ q), the
consumer has no incentive to process information as changing her beliefs to an extent that
her purchase decision changes would require processing a large amount of information, which
is too costly. Rather, the consumer makes her purchase decisions based on her prior beliefs
if this belief is high enough then she purchases and if it is low enough then she does not
purchase. Only when the prior belief is neither too high nor too low, the consumer chooses
to process information to update her belief about product fit, and her optimal information




To understand the consumer's optimal attention allocation decision, note that a con-
sumer who chooses to process product information not only wants to avoid falsely buying
a bad/mismatched product but also wants to avoid falsely rejecting a good/matched prod-
uct. All else equal, when the consumer has a higher prior belief about product fit (i.e., q is
higher) or when the loss of buying a bad product becomes relatively smaller as compared
to the gain of buying a good product (i.e., U1 or U0 increases), the motivation to avoid
falsely rejecting a good/matched product becomes higher. Therefore, the consumer would
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more attention to 
negative information
Figure 1: Confirmatory search vs. disconfirmatory search (λ = 0.05, U0 = −1)
like to pay relatively more attention to positive information and less attention to negative
information so that the signal becomes more accurate when the product indeed fits (and
the consumer would make less mistakes in this case). Conversely, when the consumer has
a lower prior belief or when the loss becomes larger, then the consumer would like to pay
more attention to negative information to avoid falsely buying a bad/mismatched product.
In short, δ∗1 increases and δ
∗
0 decreases in q, U1 and U0.
Furthermore, I characterize the consumer's attention allocation patterns into two cat-
egories: Confirmatory search and disconfirmatory search. Under confirmatory search, the
consumer pays more attention to the type of information that favors her prior belief (i.e.,
δ∗1 > δ
∗




0 if q < 0.5), as shown in the region 2 and 4 of Figure 1; In
contrast, under disconfirmatory search, the consumer pays more attention to the type of
information that disfavors her prior belief (i.e., δ∗1 < δ
∗




0 if q < 0.5),
as shown in the region 1 and 3 of Figure 1. Note that the confirmatory search discussed
above resonates with the confirmatory bias phenomenon widely studied in the psychology
literature (e.g., Nickerson 1998) which experimentally show that people tend to seek more
evidence that favors their prior beliefs. However, in contrast to the classic psychological
explanations that often perceive the confirmatory bias as an inferential error of human rea-
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Figure 2: Higher cost leads to more confirmatory search(U1 = 1.25, U0 = −1)
soning (e.g., Evans, 1989, p.41), the results in Figure 1 suggest that under some situations
the confirmatory bias could be an optimal behavior coming out of people optimizing atten-
tion to different types of information, while disconfirmatory search would be optimal under
other situations.
The following question is: When would the confirmatory search be optimal and when
would the disconfirmatory search be optimal? Interestingly, the consumer's information
processing cost plays a key role in determining whether the consumer would do confirma-
tory search or disconfirmatory search. As shown in Figure 2, the consumer would conduct
more disconfirmatory search when the information processing cost is low, but she would con-
duct more confirmatory search when the information processing cost becomes high. More
specifically, consider the case where the consumer has a high prior belief but the loss of
buying a bad product is larger than the gain of buying a good product (i.e., U1 < |U0|), as
shown in Figure 3a. In this case, when the information processing cost is low, the consumer
would pay high attention to both types of information, and since the loss is larger than
the gain, the consumer would pay relatively more attention to negative information than
positive information in order to reduce the risk of buying a bad product. Therefore, the
consumer conducts the disconfirmatory search that disfavors her high prior belief. However,
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when the information processing cost becomes high enough, the consumer's attention allo-
cation is mainly influenced by her prior belief and thus she would engage in confirmatory
search in which she spends more time and efforts on processing positive information than
negative information so that the signal received by the consumer is relatively more accu-
rate in the fit situation which the consumer believes is more likely to happen than not
fit situation. This implies that the confirmatory bias in psychology literature could be
an optimal behavior especially when the consumer has high cognitive limitations and thus
high information processing cost. Similarly, one can explain other cases in Figure 3. Note
that when the gain is large and prior belief is high (Figure 3c), or when the loss is large
and prior belief is low (Figure 3d), the consumer would always do the confirmatory search,
with the belief-confirming effect increasing with the cost (the difference between δ1 and δ0
always increases in the information processing cost). I summarize the analysis above in the
following proposition.








λ − 1)(1− e−U1λ ). The following holds:
1. If U1 > |U0|, when q > −U0U1−U0 , δ∗1 > δ∗0; when q < −U0U1−U0 , δ∗1 > δ∗0 for λ < λ∗ and
δ∗1 < δ
∗
0 for λ > λ
∗.
2. If U1 < |U0|, when q < −U0U1−U0 , δ∗1 < δ∗0; when q > −U0U1−U0 , δ∗1 < δ∗0 for λ < λ∗ and
δ∗1 > δ
∗
0 for λ > λ
∗.
Proof: See appendix.
Because of the impact of information cost on attention allocation, the consumer's pur-
chase likelihood may vary with the cost in a non-monotonic way. Consider again the case
where the consumer has a high prior belief but the loss of buying a bad product is large
(Figure 4a). As discussed earlier, when the information processing cost becomes higher,
the consumer would first conduct disconfirmatory search with more attention paid to the
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(a) Case I: High q and U1 < |U0|
















(b) Case II: Low q and U1 > |U0|















(c) Case III: High q and U1 > |U0|















(d) Case IV: Low q and U1 < |U0|
Figure 3: Impact of information processing cost on attention allocation
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(a) Case I: High q and U1 < |U0|



















(b) Case II: Low q and U1 > |U0|























(c) Case III: High q and U1 > |U0|

























(d) Case IV: Low q and U1 < |U0|
Figure 4: Impact of information processing cost on purchase likelihood
negative information and then conduct the confirmatory search with more attention paid
to positive information. Therefore, the consumer's purchase likelihood first decreases and
then increases with the consumer's information processing cost. Similarly, one can explain
other cases in Figure 4. Note that the non-monotonic impact of information processing cost
comes out of consumer's attention allocation decision, in contrast to the monotonic results
typically found in previous studies on consumer search without attention allocation (e.g.,
Branco et al. (2012) show that the consumer's purchase likelihood either always increase or
always decrease with information processing cost.). Proposition 3 summarizes the impact
of information processing cost on purchase likelihood.




















1. If U1 > |U0|, when q > −U0U1−U0 , the purchase likelihood always increases with information
processing cost (i.e., dP (S=1)
dλ
> 0); when q < −U0
U1−U0 , the purchase likelihood increases
with information processing cost for λ < λˆ , and it decreases with the cost for λ > λˆ.
2. If U1 < |U0|, when q < −U0U1−U0 , the purchase likelihood always decreases with infor-
mation processing cost (i.e., dP (S=1)
dλ
< 0); when q > −U0
U1−U0 , the purchase likelihood
decreases with information processing cost for λ < λˆ , and it increases with the cost
for λ > λˆ.
Proof: See appendix.
Comparison with Symmetric Signal Case
The most significant feature of the model above is that the consumer is allowed to flexibly
allocate attention to various product information, which is in contrast to the traditional
consumer search model ignoring such feature. In this section, I examine whether and how
this flexible attention allocation may lead to different implications from those obtained in
traditional search model.
Specifically, consider the case where the consumer is not allowed to do the differential
learning, i.e., the consumer chooses the signal precision of a symmetric signal. That is, I
assume P (X = 1|S = 1) = P (X = 0|S = 0) and thus the consumer's information processing
decision is characterized by choosing only one conditional probability: δ ≡ P (X = S). The
higher the signal precision (i.e., δ ≡ P (X = S)) is, the more information is processed.
By trading off the value and cost of information, the consumer chooses the optimal signal





P (S = 1)[P (X = 1|S = 1)U1 + P (X = 0|S = 1)U0 ]− λI(X,S)
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where I(X,S) = −[qδ + (1 − q)(1 − δ)] log[qδ + (1 − q)(1 − δ)] − [1 − qδ − (1 − q)(1 −
δ)] log[1− qδ − (1− q)(1− δ)] + δ log δ + (1− δ) log(1− δ).
Figure 5 compares the impact of information processing cost on consumer's purchase
likelihood under the asymmetric attention model (main model) and symmetric attention
model (benchmark). Clearly, the implications are strikingly different. Specifically, consider
the case where the consumer has a high prior belief that the product would fit her. As infor-
mation processing cost becomes higher, if she is able to flexibly allocate attention, she would
process less information but would allocate relatively more attention to positive information
than negative information (belief-confirming effect), and thus the purchase likelihood would
increase in consumer's information processing cost; however, if she is not able to do the
differential learning, higher information processing cost makes the consumer process less in-
formation including the positive information and thus the purchase likelihood would instead
decrease in information processing cost. Similarly, in the case where the consumer has a
low prior belief, the purchase likelihood would decrease in information processing cost un-
der asymmetric attention but would increase under symmetric attention. This comparison
highlights the importance of taking into account the consumer's attention allocation when
studying the consumer's information processing and purchase behavior.
3.3 Extension: Optimal Attention Allocation under Irreducible Uncertainty
In the previous case, an implicit assumption is that all of the information is available to
the consumer and thus the consumer can fully reduce the uncertainty about product fit if
she processes all the information. However, there often exists some uncertainty that the
consumer can not reduce. For example, the full product information may not always be
available to the consumer. To see this, consider the case where a consumer is booking a
cruise trip one month ahead. The weather in the destination is an important factor that
the consumer takes into account, but it is almost impossible for the consumer to precisely
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(a) Case I: Under high prior belief


















(b) Case II: Under low prior belief
Figure 5: Comparison between asymmetric attention and symmetric attention
predict the weather one month later in the destination. Therefore, there is irreducible
uncertainty about the weather condition in this example. Besides the unavailability of some
product information, the credibility of information can also lead to irreducible uncertainty.
For instance, online product reviews may be fake and detection of a fake review is often
very difficult for both the review sites and the reviewers, thereby leading to some irreducible
uncertainty about product fit.
In this section, I am interested in the following question: As more information becomes
available or credible, e.g., as more online product reviews become available and can be ver-
ified by the review site, how would a consumer change her attention allocation strategy? In
particular, would the consumer increase attention to positive information or negative infor-
mation? In the following, I extend our basic model in the previous section by incorporating
the irreducible uncertainty.
First, denote X ∈ {0, 1} as the interim state for fit given the consumer processes all
the information available to her. Specifically, if X = 1, it implies that the consumer's
belief about product fit increases if the consumer processes all the available information;
conversely, if X = 0, it means that the consumer's belief about product fit decreases if she
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processes all available product information. Next, denote Y ∈ {0, 1} as the final state for
fit, where Y = 1 means the product indeed fits and Y = 0 means the product does not
fit. Furthermore, denote α ≡ P (X = Y ) as the probability of interim state X being equal
to the final state Y , where 1
2
≤ α ≤ 1. In particular, as more uncertainty can be reduced
(e.g., more product information becomes available or credible), α increases. Note that if
α = 1, then it implies that full product information is available to the consumer, and the
consumer faces the same problem of information processing as in the previous section; but
if α = 1
2
, then it means that no product information is available to the consumer and the
consumer makes a purchase decision based on her prior belief. For simplicity, I assume the
consumer has an equal prior belief about product fit, i.e., P (Y = 1) = P (Y = 0) = 1
2
.
This assumption leads to clear results and our main results would not change qualitatively
under an arbitrary prior belief. Note that given this equal prior belief, it is easy to see that
P (X = 1) = P (X = 0) = 1
2
.
As in the previous section, the consumer's information processing strategy is character-
ized her choice of the signal structure δ1 ≡ P (S = 1|X = 1) and δ0 ≡ P (S = 0|X = 0).
Different signal realizations lead to different actions and thus the value of information is
quantified by EV ≡ P (S = 1)(P (Y = 1|S = 1)U1 + P (Y = 0|S = 1)U0), while the cost of
information is quantified by λI(X,S). Note that the consumer can only reduce the uncer-
tainty about the interim state X. In particular, the consumer can perfectly know the state
X if she processes all the available information, but she can not further reduce uncertainty
between interim state X and final state Y . In other words, α measures the amount of
reducible uncertainty, which is exogenous to the consumer (the higher α is, the more un-
certainty is reducible). Furthermore, since the consumer can only reduce uncertainty about
X, the cost function is given by λI(X,S) rather than λI(Y, S).
Taking into account the irreducible uncertainty, the consumer chooses the optimal signal




P (S = 1)(P (Y = 1|S = 1)U1 + P (Y = 0|S = 1)U0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
value of information
− λI(X;S)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost of information
(8)
s.t. δ1 + δ0 > 1






∗ ≥ max{EU ′, 0}, then the consumer
chooses to process information with optimal signal structure, δ∗1 and δ
∗
0, given by (8), and
then she purchases the product only when receiving the positive signal (i.e., S = 1). Other-
wise, if max{EU ′, 0} > EU∗, then the consumer chooses not to learn and makes a purchase
decision based on her prior belief (i.e., the consumer purchases the product if and only if
EU ′ ≥ 0). The following proposition characterizes the optimal attention allocation under
irreducible uncertainty.
Proposition 4 Define k = U1+U0
λ
, l = αU1+(1−α)U0
λ
, l′ = (1−α)U1+αU0
λ
, h = 1 + 2(1−e
k)
2ek−(el+el′ ) ,





′ = λ log(1+
√
1−ek)−U0
U1−U0 . The following holds:












< α ≤ α∗, the consumer purchases without learning.










< α ≤ α′, the consumer does not learn and does not purchase.
The above proposition shows that if most of the product information is not available or
not credible (i.e., α is small), then paying attention to the available information would not
change a consumer's belief very much, and thus the consumer would not start to process any





U0 ≥ 0 and choose





U0 < 0. Only when α is high enough, the consumer would
process some information, and her subsequent attention allocation decision is influenced by
α. In the following, I investigate whether the consumer would increase attention to positive
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Figure 6: Impact of irreducible uncertainty on attention allocation under high prior utility
information or negative information as more information becomes available and credible
(i.e., α becomes larger).
First, under a relatively high α such that the consumer chooses to process information,





U0 ≥ 0 (note that the prior belief P (X = 1) = 12), then the
consumer would allocate relatively more attention to the positive information than negative
information because the gain of buying a good product is larger than the loss of buying a bad
product. Now, since the consumer initially pays less attention to the negative information, it






). Therefore, as α becomes higher, the consumer has a higher incentive to learn and
would increase attention to the negative information and thus the signal accuracy δ0 becomes
higher. In the meanwhile, since attention is limited, the consumer would decrease attention
to the positive information so that the signal accuracy δ1 under fit state decreases, but if
α becomes high enough, then the consumer has a very high incentive to process information
and thus she would increase attention to both positive and negative information (See Figure
6a). Overall, the consumer's purchase likelihood would decrease in α if the prior utility of
the product is high (Figure 6b).
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Figure 7: Impact of irreducible uncertainty on attention allocation under low prior utility





U0 < 0, the consumer would increase attention
to the positive information as α becomes higher, because the consumer initially pays less
attention to the positive information due to the low prior utility and thus it is marginally
cheaper to improve δ1 as α becomes higher. In the meanwhile, the consumer would first
decrease and then increase attention to positive information as α becomes higher (Figure 7a
). Overall, the consumer's purchase likelihood would increase in α (Figure 7b). I summarize
the discussion above in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 The following holds:





U0 < 0, δ
∗
0 increases with α for α
∗ < α < 1; δ∗1 decreases
with α for α∗ < α ≤ min{α∗∗, 1} and increases with α for min{α∗∗, 1} < α < 1.
Purchase probability P (S = 1) decreases with α for α∗ < α < 1.





U0 < 0, δ
∗
1 increases with α for α
′ < α < 1; δ∗0 decreases with
α for α′ < α ≤ min{α′′, 1} and increases with α for min{α′′, 1} < α < 1. Purchase
probability P (S = 1) increases with α for α′ < α < 1.
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Chapter 4: Firm Strategies under Consumer Attention Allocation
Since the consumer's attention allocation decision determines how the consumer would
eventually evaluate the product, it is important for the seller to understand the interac-
tion between a certain marketing strategy and the consumer's attention allocation decision.
Therefore, in this chapter, I turn my attention to study the firm strategies in response to
the consumer's attention allocation decision. In the following, I consider several marketing
strategies that closely interact with the consumer's attention allocation: Pricing, return
policy and information design (i.e., the seller chooses how much information and which
information available for consumers to process).
4.1 Price
Denote X ∈ {0, 1} as the binary state for fit and p as the price chosen by the seller. If the
product fits (i.e., X = 1), the consumer obtains utility U1 = 1 + w − p, and if the product
does not fit (i.e., X = 0), then the consumer obtains utility U0 = 1 − p. In this case, the
base utility of product is normalized to be 1 and w > 0 is the match value. The utility of
the outside option is assumed to be 0.
Facing uncertainty about the match, the consumer can process information to reduce the
uncertainty. As in Chapter 3, I assume that the consumer has a prior belief P (X = 1) = q,
and the signal structure chosen by the consumer is characterized by two state-dependent
signal accuracy: δ1 ≡ P (S = 1|X = 1) and δ0 ≡ P (S = 0|X = 0). On the one hand, when
the consumer chooses to process information prior to making a purchase decision, she chooses
an optimal information processing strategy, characterized by δ∗1 and δ
∗
0, that maximizes the
net expected utility. Note that when the consumer receives a positive signal (i.e., S = 1), she
always chooses to purchase the product; but when the consumer receives a negative signal
(i.e., S = 0), she chooses her outside option. Therefore, when the consumer chooses to
process information, she can obtain utility EU∗ under optimal attention allocation strategy
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Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
Figure 8: Stages of the game
(i.e., δ∗1 and δ
∗
0) that maximizes the net expected utility as follows.
EU∗ ≡ sup
δ1,δ0
P (S = 1)(P (X = 1|S = 1)(1 + w − p) + P (X = 0|S = 1)(1− p))︸ ︷︷ ︸
value of information
− λI(X;S)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost of information
(9)
s.t. δ1 + δ0 > 1
On the other hand, if the consumer chooses not to process information, then she makes
the purchase decision based on her prior belief. In this case, the utility from purchasing
based on prior belief is EU ′ = qU1 + (1 − q)U0, and she purchases the product if and only
if EU ′ ≥ 0.
First, the seller decides the product price, p. Then, the consumer observes the price and
decides whether or not to process information to reduce the uncertainty about product fit.
Specifically, If max{EU ′, 0} ≥ EU∗, then the consumer chooses not to learn and makes a
purchase decision based on her prior belief (i.e., the consumer purchases the product if and
only if EU ′ ≥ 0); otherwise, if max{EU ′, 0} < EU∗, then the consumer chooses to process
information with optimal signal structure, δ∗1 and δ
∗
0, and she purchases the product only
when receiving the signal S = 1.
Define k = w
λ
, l = p−1
λ
, p = 1− λ log(1− q + qe−k) and p = 1 + λ log(1− q + qek). The
following proposition shows how the price affects the consumer's attention allocation.
Proposition 6 The following holds:
1. If p ≤ p, the consumer processes no information and buys the product.
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2. If p < p < p¯, δ∗1 and δ
∗














The purchase probability P (S = 1) = q
1−e−l+
1−q
1−ek−l . Particularly, when price p becomes
higher, δ∗1 decreases and δ
∗
0 increases.
3. If p ≥ p¯, the consumer processes no information and does not buy the product.
Proof: See appendix.
As illustrated in Figure 9, when the price is low enough (i.e., p ≤ p), there is not
much gain from processing information because it would not hurt much even if the product
turns out to not fit the consumer. Thus, due to the high prior utility of the product, the
consumer processes no information and buys the product. When the price is high enough
(i.e., p ≥ p¯), there is not much gain as well from processing information because the utility of
the product is low even if the product turns out to fit the consumer, and thus the consumer
processes no information and does not buy the product. Only when the price is medium
(i.e., p < p < p¯), the consumer has an incentive to reduce the uncertainty by processing
information. In particular, as price becomes higher but not too high, the utility of buying a
matched product decreases, while the disutility of buying a mismatched product increases.
Therefore, the consumer increases attention to negative information and decreases attention
to positive information as the price increases, i.e., δ∗1 decreases and δ
∗
0 increases in price p.
Going on to the firm's problem, according to Proposition 6, there exist two pricing
regimes under which the consumer may purchase: (1) learning-prevented pricing strategy
(i.e., p ≤ p) under which the seller charges a relatively low price so that the consumer
purchases the product without processing information, and (2) learning-promoted pricing
strategy (i.e., p < p < p¯) under which the seller charges a relatively high price so that the






Consumers always buy 
without any learning
Consumers always learn and 
buy the product if 𝑆 = 1
Consumers do not learn 
and do not buy
𝑝 𝑝
Figure 9: Learning-Prevented and Learning-Promoted Strategies (horizontal axis denotes
price)
Under the learning-prevented pricing strategy (i.e., p ≤ p), consumers buy the prod-
uct without processing information. Therefore, the demand is Dpre = 1 (I normalize the
size of the market to be 1). The optimal price is the maximum possible price at which
the consumer does not learn, which is given by p∗pre = p. Correspondingly, the optimal
profit is pi∗pre = p
∗
preDpre = p. Note that both the optimal price and profit increase in in-
formation processing cost λ. The intuition is the following: under the learning-prevented
pricing strategy, the seller charges a price such that the consumer is indifferent between pro-
cessing information and buying the product without processing information. Therefore, as
information processing cost becomes higher, the consumer has a lower incentive to process
information, thereby allowing the seller to charge a higher price without inducing consumers
to learn.
Under the learning-promoted pricing strategy (i.e., p < p < p¯), the consumer processes
information and purchases the product when receiving S = 1. Thus, the demand in this




1−ek−l , and the seller chooses optimal price p
∗
pro that










s.t. p < p < p¯.
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Figure 10: Impact of consumer information processing cost on price and profit. For the
plots, q = 0.5, w = 3.
Note that since a higher price induces consumer to pay more attention to negative infor-
mation of a product and this effect becomes stronger under a higher information processing
cost, the demand sensitivity to price becomes higher as information processing cost becomes
higher, forcing the seller to charge a lower price (i.e., p∗pro decreases in λ). This is shown in
the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Given p < p < p¯, as information processing cost λ becomes higher, the





Overall, when the consumer has a low information processing cost, she has a high in-
centive to process information and her willingness to pay becomes higher when receiving a
positive signal S = 1, and thus the seller prefers the learning-promoted pricing strategy
to encourage the consumer to learn. However, when the consumer has a high information
processing cost, she has a low incentive to process information and thus the seller prefers
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the learning-prevented pricing strategy to induce the consumer to buy the product with-
out any learning. Because of the switch of pricing regime, the optimal price and profit
may first decrease (under learning-promoted pricing strategy) and then increase (under
learning-prevented pricing strategy) in the consumer's information processing cost. This
is illustrated in Figure 10. The analysis above is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 8 The optimal price and profit may first decrease and then increase in the
consumer's information processing cost λ.
Proof: The proof is clear from the arguments above.
Pricing without considering attention allocation In the pricing model above, I consider
the firm's pricing decision when the consumer can flexibly choose the signal structure, i.e,
choose both how much information to process and how to allocate attention to different types
of information. In order to further examine how the consumer's attention allocation decision
influences the firm's pricing decision, I compare the results above with those obtained in
the following case where the consumer is not allowed to do the differential learning, i.e., the
consumer chooses the signal precision of a symmetric signal. Specifically, I assume P (X =
1|S = 1) = P (X = 0|S = 0) and thus the consumer's information processing decision is
characterized by choosing only one conditional probability: δ ≡ P (X = S). This model
serves as benchmark with which I can compare the results of the full model to understand
how seller strategies may be different under the more general learning formulation.
In the benchmark model, the higher the signal precision (i.e., δ ≡ P (X = S)) is, the more
information is processed. By trading off the value and cost of information, the consumer





P (S = 1)[P (X = 1|S = 1)(1 + w − p) + P (X = 0|S = 1)(1− p) ]− λI(X,S)
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where I(X,S) = −[qδ + (1 − q)(1 − δ)] log[qδ + (1 − q)(1 − δ)] − [1 − qδ − (1 − q)(1 −
δ)] log[1− qδ − (1− q)(1− δ)] + δ log δ + (1− δ) log(1− δ).
I find that the consumer's asymmetric attention allocation restricts the firm's pricing
capabilities and thus reduces the profit (see Figure 11). Specifically, in the asymmetric
attention model, the consumer can obtain higher utility by allocating differential attention
to different types of information. Therefore, when the information processing cost is very
high and the seller carries out the learning-prevented pricing strategy, the seller has to
charge a lower price in the asymmetric case to prevent the consumer from learning than
it does in the symmetric case. On the other hand, when the information processing cost
is very low and the consumer chooses to learn, the demand sensitivity to price is higher
in the asymmetric case than in the symmetric case. Therefore, under learning-promoted
pricing strategy, the seller has to charge a lower price as well in the asymmetric case than
in the symmetric case. Note that if the prior belief that the product will fit is high, then
the consumer will allocate relatively more attention to positive information and less atten-
tion to negative information as the information processing cost becomes higher. This effect
makes the learning-promoted pricing strategy generally more attractive to the seller in the
asymmetric case than in the symmetric case. Therefore, when the information processing
cost is medium, the seller may undercharge the price without considering the consumer's
asymmetric attention allocation, because the seller would carry out learning-promoted
pricing strategy in the asymmetric case but carry out learning-prevented pricing strategy
in the symmetric case (Figure 11(a)). Since the consumer's asymmetric attention allocation
restricts the firm's pricing capabilities, the seller obtains a lower profit in asymmetric at-
tention case than in symmetric case (Figure 11(b)). I summarize the analysis above in the
following proposition.
Proposition 9 Asymmetric attention allocation restricts the firm's pricing capabilities and
thus reduces the seller's profit.
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Figure 11: Comparison between Asymmetric Model and Symmetric (Benchmark) Model
(for the plots, q = 0.8, w = 2).
Proof: The proof is clear from the arguments above.
4.2 Return Policy
It is common that a seller offers return policy that allows consumers to return the product if it
turns out not to fit. How does this return policy influence the consumer's attention allocation
decision? And when should the seller offer the return policy taking into account its impact
on consumer's attention allocation? In this section, I answer these questions. Specifically,
as before, if X = 1 (i.e., the product fits), the utility from purchasing is UX=1 = 1 + w − p;
However, if X = 0 (i.e., the product does not fit) and if the consumer returns the product,
the utility is UX=0 = −cr, where cr > 0 is the returning cost for the consumer, while if he
chooses not to return, then the utility is UX=0 = 1 − p. Clearly, the consumer will return
the mismatched product if and only if p ≥ 1 + cr. Note that if the seller offers the return
policy but charges a price p such that p < 1 + cr, then the consumer does not return the
mismatched product and thus the seller faces the same profit optimization problem as in
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Section except with an additional constraint on price (i.e., p < 1 + cr), which implies that
offering return policy would never increase the profit in this case. Therefore, whenever the
seller chooses to offer return policy, the price p must be larger or equal to 1 + cr.
I analyze this model in the lines of our previous analyses. The timing is the same as
in Section except that at the beginning, the seller decides whether or not to offer a return
policy in addition to choosing the price. Define k = w
λ
, l = p−1
λ
and h = cr
λ
. The optimal
signal structure, δ∗1,r and δ
∗













1− e−(k+l+h) . (12)
By comparing (10) with (12), I find that offering return policy induces the consumer to
allocate relatively more attention to positive information and less attention to negative in-






0). Intuitively, offering return policy decreases the loss
of buying a mismatched product because the consumer can always return the mismatched
product. Therefore, the consumer has a lower incentive to pay attention to negative infor-
mation and correspondingly increases attention to positive information.
Proceeding to the firm's decisions, I find that under return policy, there also exist two
pricing regimes under which the consumer may purchase. Define pr = 1 +w+ cr +λ log(1−
1−e−h
q
) and p¯r = 1+w+cr−λ log(1+ eh−1q ). For 1+cr ≤ p ≤ pr, the seller follows a learning-
prevented pricing strategy and for pr < p < p¯
r, the seller follows a learning-promoted
pricing strategy (for p ≥ p¯r, consumers do not learn and do not purchase.). Under the
learning-prevented pricing strategy (i.e., 1 + cr ≤ p ≤ pr), the consumer processes no
information and buys the product. In this case, with probability P (X = 0) = 1 − q, the
product purchased by the consumer does not fit and thus the consumer returns it back
to the seller. Consequently, the final demand for the product is always q and the seller
charges optimal price p∗pre,r = pr and obtains profit pi
∗
pre,r = qpr. Under the learning-
promoted pricing strategy (i.e., pr < p < p¯
r), the consumer chooses to learn and chooses
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the optimal signal structure given in (12). In this case, the demand for the product is
Dpro,r = P (S = 1)P (X = 1|S = 1) = P (X = 1)P (S = 1|X = 1) = qδ∗1,r and the seller




s.t. pr < p < p¯
r
Given information processing cost λ, the seller chooses to offer return policy if and only
if max{pi∗pre,r, pi∗pro,r} ≥ max{pi∗pre, pi∗pro}, where pi∗pre and pi∗pro are the optimal profits without
return policy under learning-prevented and learning-promoted pricing strategy respec-
tively. I find that offering return policy is not profitable when the information processing
cost is very high. This is illustrated through an example in Figure 12(a). When the infor-
mation processing cost is high, the seller prefers learning-prevented pricing strategy under
which the seller discourages the consumer from learning. In this case, offering a return policy
further reduces the consumer's learning incentive, which allows the seller to charge a higher
price. However, when the information processing cost is very high, this price increasing
effect of return policy is small and cannot offset the demand decreasing effect, and offering
a return policy in this case would reduce the firm's profit. On the other hand, when the
information processing cost is low, the seller prefers learning-promoted pricing strategy
under which the consumer always processes information. In this case, offering return policy
induces the consumer to allocate relatively more attention to positive information and less
attention to negative information. This asymmetric attention allocation effect of return pol-
icy alleviates the demand decreasing effect of return policy and promotes the price increasing
effect. Overall, the seller prefers offering return policy when the information processing cost
is not very high.
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(a) Asymmetric attention model





















(b) Symmetric attention model (benchmark)
Figure 12: Profitability of Return Policy
As before, I compare the asymmetric attention model with the symmetric attention
(benchmark) model in which the consumer chooses the signal precision of a symmetric signal.
I find that the consumer's flexible attention allocation improves the profitability of return
policy. Specifically, offering a return policy induces the consumer to allocate relatively more
attention to positive information and less attention to negative information, thus alleviating
the demand decreasing effect of return policy but promoting the price increasing effect, and
failure of considering this asymmetric attention allocation effect of return policy would make
return policy appear less attractive. In particular, when the learning cost is low and the
seller carries out the learning-promoted pricing strategy, the symmetric attention model
would suggest that the seller should not offer a return policy (Figure 12(b)), which is not
suggested by the asymmetric attention model (Figure 12(a)). I summarize the analysis
above in the following proposition.
Proposition 10 The seller prefers offering return policy unless the information processing
cost is very high. Furthermore, the consumer's flexible attention allocation improves the
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profitability of return policy.
Proof: The proof is clear from the arguments above.
4.3 Firm Information Design
A seller often can decide how much information and which information is available for
consumers to process. For example, a software company can decide how many and which
features are available for consumers to try in its free trial, and a seller may also have an
incentive to suppress the negative product information, e.g., the seller can pay the third
party to remove some negative online product reviews about its product. In general, a
seller can influence the information environment in various ways, which is referred to as
information design. In the following, I start to investigate the firm's information design
taking into account the consumer's attention allocation behavior. In particular, I examine
when a seller has a high incentive vs. low incentive to suppress the negative information in
the environment.
As before, consider a consumer who wants to reduce the uncertainty about whether the
product matches her needs or not. Denote X ∈ {0, 1} as the binary state for fit. If X = 1,
then the product fits and the consumer obtains utility U1 = 1 − p from purchasing, where
p is the price of the product; if X = 0, the product does not fit and the consumer obtains
utility U0 = w − p from purchasing, where w < 1. I assume that the utility of the outside
option is 0. The consumer does not know ex ante the value of state X but has a prior belief
about it denoted by q ≡ P (X = 1) (and I assume that the seller has the same prior belief as
the consumer). By processing information, the consumer receives a signal S ∈ {0, 1} about
the state of X based on which the consumer can update her belief about product fit, and
she can choose the signal structure δ1 ≡ P (S = 1|X = 1) and δ0 ≡ P (S = 0|X = 0) before
processing any information. The timing of the game is discussed as follows (Figure 13).
At the beginning, the seller not only chooses the price but also chooses how much and
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Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
Figure 13: Stages of the game with information design
which information to be available for consumers to process (referred to as information
design). In particular, the seller's information design imposes the upper bounds Ω1 and
Ω0 on signal structure such that P (S = 1|X = 1) ≤ Ω1 and P (S = 0|X = 0) ≤ Ω0.
For example, when the seller suppresses the negative information in the environment (e.g.,
removing some negative product reviews on some reviews sites), consumers are less likely
to find out the serious drawbacks of the product that matter to them and thus they may
be more likely to mistakenly buy a mismatched product, which corresponds to a lower Ω0.
Consider another information design example where a seller decides whether or not to allow
his customers who purchased the product to write public reviews on the product page of the
seller's own official website. Allowing customers to do this can enrich product information
in the environment, which increases both Ω1 and Ω0. In particular, if dissatisfied customers
are more likely than satisfied customers to leave reviews, then the seller actually chooses an
information environment in which Ω0 may be higher than Ω1. In addition to the examples
above, a seller may have other ways to influence the information environment. For instance,
a seller can decide how many and which features to be available in the free trial of his
product or choose the public testing environment for his product, which also determines
the information structure Ω1 and Ω0. Note that throughout this paper I focus on the case
where a seller can fully control the information environment (that is, the seller can flexibly
choose Ω0 and Ω1.). This allows me to obtain clear results about the seller's incentive of
information design in response to the consumer's attention allocation behavior, and the main
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results in the following would not change qualitatively if we restricts the seller's capability of
influencing the information environment, e.g., the consumer may obtain product information
from sources that can not be influenced by the seller.
Next, observing the price and information design by the seller, the consumer decides
whether or not to process information to reduce uncertainty about product fit. Note that in
many cases, consumers indeed have the chance to observe the information design before pro-
cessing information. For example, in the free trial case, a consumer may first observe what
features are included in the free trial and then decides whether or not to incur costs to try
it. Besides, in the public testing example, a consumer may also first observe the testing en-
vironment and then chooses whether or not to pay attention to the results coming out of the
testing. This observability assumption is similar to the assumption that a sender commits
to the signal structure, which has been widely used in Bayesian Persuasion literature (e.g.,
Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011, Gentzkow and Kamenica 2016).4 As discussed earlier, when
she decides to process information, she chooses the signal structure δ1 ≡ P (S = 1|X = 1)
and δ0 ≡ P (S = 0|X = 0) by optimizing attention to different types of information available
to her. That is, she chooses an optimal signal structure, δ∗1 and δ
∗
0, that maximizes the net
expected utility as follows:
EU∗ ≡ sup
δ1,δ0
qδ1(1− p) + (1− q)(1− δ0)(w − p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
value of information
− λI(X,S)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost of information
(13)
s.t. 0 < δ1 ≤ Ω1, 0 < δ0 ≤ Ω0 and δ1 + δ0 > 1.
Denote EU ′ ≡ qU1 + (1 − q)U0 as the expected utility based on the consumer's prior
belief (referred to as prior utility). If EU∗ ≥ max{EU ′, 0}, then the consumer chooses to
process information with optimal signal structure, δ∗1 and δ
∗
0, given by (13), and then she
purchases the product only when receiving the positive signal (i.e., S = 1). Otherwise, if
4A seller may also influence the information environment in an unobservable way, and how consumer's
attention allocation affects this kind of information design is left for future research.
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max{EU ′, 0} > EU∗, then the consumer chooses not to learn and makes a purchase decision
based on her prior belief (i.e., the consumer purchases the product if and only if EU ′ ≥ 0).
On the one hand, if the seller charges a relatively low price p such that p ≤ q+ (1− q)w
(and thus prior utility EU ′ ≡ q(1− p) + (1− q)(w− p) ≥ 0), then the seller has no incentive
to provide information, because the consumer would always purchase the product when no
information is available. On the other hand, if the seller charges a relatively high price p such
that p > q + (1− q)w (and thus prior utility EU ′ < 0), then the seller has to provide some
information in order to invite the consumer to learn the match information. Otherwise, if
no information is provided, then the consumer would not buy the product because of the
low prior utility (i.e., EU ′ < 0). Therefore, the seller would provide information only when
p > q + (1− q)w. In the following, I first discuss the seller's optimal information design to
maximize the consumer's purchase likelihood given p > q + (1 − q)w, and then I consider
both optimal information design and optimal pricing decision.
Given p > q + (1 − q)w, suppose the seller provides full information (i.e., Ω1 = 1
and Ω0 = 1). Under this full-information case, the consumer faces the same information





and q = p−w
1−w , the consumer chooses to process information with optimal signal
structure δ∗1 and δ
∗
0 that maximizes (6), and the seller can obtain profit pˆi = P (S = 1)p =
(qδ∗1 +(1−q)(1−δ∗0))p. Now, all else equal, suppose the seller imposes a constraint Ω0 = δ∗0−
on the signal structure P (S = 0|X = 0), where  > 0 is an arbitrary small positive value.
Given this constraint, the consumer's optimal attention allocation in (13) is given by δ∗∗1
and δ∗∗0 , where δ
∗∗
0 is bounded at Ω0 (i.e., δ
∗∗
0 = Ω0 = δ
∗
0 − ) and δ∗∗1 satisfies δ∗1 < δ∗∗1 < 1.
In other words, under the information constraint Ω0 = δ
∗
0 − , the consumer would process
relatively less negative information but would process relatively more positive information
as compared to the full information case. This increases the consumer's purchase likelihood
and thus the seller obtains higher profit p˜i (i.e., p˜i = (qδ∗∗1 + (1 − q)(1 − (δ∗0 − )))p > pˆi =
(qδ∗1 + (1 − q)(1 − δ∗0))p). Therefore, a seller would further reduce Ω0 until the consumer
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is indifferent between processing information and not processing information (and not buy
the product)5. Denote Ω∗0 as the optimal upper bound that the seller can impose on P (S =
0|X = 0), and denote EU∗design as the utility of optimal learning under the constraint Ω∗0.
Since EU∗design = P (S = 1)(P (X = 1|S = 1)U1 + P (X = 0|S = 1)U0) − λI(X,S), one can
obtain the following relationship
EU∗design = qδ
∗∗
1 (1− p) + (1− q)(1− Ω∗0)(w − p)− λI(X,S)δ1=δ∗∗1 ,δ0=Ω∗0, = 0 (14)
I(X,S)δ1=δ∗∗1 ,δ0=Ω∗0,exo is given in (5) with δ1 = δ
∗∗







1 < 1 and is given by the first order condition of consumer maximizing the utility of




q + (1− q) Ω∗0
1−δ∗∗1
q + (1− q)1−Ω∗0
δ∗∗1
(15)
Note that equation (14) and (15) jointly determine Ω∗0 and δ
∗∗
1 . Next, it is easy to see
that the seller has no incentive to impose constraint Ω1 on P (S = 1|X = 1), because any Ω1
satisfying δ∗∗1 ≤ Ω1 ≤ 1 would not change the consumer's information processing strategy
and thus would not change her purchase likelihood (if Ω1 < δ
∗∗
1 , then δ
∗∗
1 is bounded at Ω1
and the consumer's purchase likelihood always decreases). However, for ease of exposition, I
always assume that the seller sets the constraint Ω∗1 = δ
∗∗
1 , i.e., the seller has no incentive to
provide information more than the amount that the consumer will process. This assumption
can be justified when the seller has an arbitrarily small cost to provide information.
Since the seller's main incentive of information design is to impose the constraint Ω0
on P (S = 0|X = 0), I am interested in how this incentive is influenced by the consumer's
5Note that EU ′ < 0 under p > q+(1− q)w. So if the consumer does not process information, she would
choose her outside option. I also assume that the consumer would always process information when she is
indifferent between processing information and not processing information.
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attention allocation behavior. First, when the consumer has a lower prior belief about
product fit, our intuition may suggest that a seller would have a higher incentive to suppress
negative information. However, this intuition has a flaw, because it does not consider how the
consumer's prior belief influences her attention allocation to different types of information.
As discussed in Chapter 3, a lower prior belief would motivate the consumer to pay relatively
more attention to negative information and less attention to positive information. Therefore,
in order to invite the consumer with a lower prior belief to process information, the seller has
to relax the constraint Ω0, allowing relatively more negative information available for the
consumer to process. Otherwise, the utility of learning would be too low for the consumer
and thus she would not process information and not buy the product (note that the prior
utilityEU ′ < 0 given p > q + (1 − q)w). In short, if the consumer has a lower prior belief,
the seller would make relatively more negative information available for the consumer to
process, i.e., optimal information constraint Ω∗0 decreases with consumer's prior belief q.
Moreover, when the seller relaxes Ω0 and thus more negative information is available for
the consumer to process, the consumer would decrease attention to positive information
(i.e., δ∗∗1 decreases), inducing the seller to decrease Ω1 (under the assumption that the
seller has no incentive to provide information more than the amount that the consumer will
process).Therefore, the optimal constraint Ω∗1 increases with q (see Figure 14a).
Similarly, as the consumer's information processing cost λ becomes higher, the utility of
processing information decreases. Thus, to invite the consumer to learn, the seller has to
relax the constraint Ω0, allowing relatively more negative information available for consumers
to process. Thus, the optimal constraint Ω∗0 increases in consumer's information processing
cost λ (and the optimal constraint Ω∗1 decreases in λ because the consumer would decrease
attention to positive information, see Figure 14b). The analysis above is summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 11 (Optimal information design under exogenous price) Denote δ∗1
54
and δ∗0 as the optimal signal structure chosen by the consumer under full information case.
Suppose price p is exogenously given,




< q < q¯ ≡ p−w
1−w , then the seller would design an information environ-
ment characterized by Ω∗0 and Ω
∗
1 to invite the consumer to learn. Under this information de-
sign, the optimal signal structure δ∗∗1 and δ
∗∗







and δ∗1 < δ
∗∗
1 < 1,, i.e., the consumer processes relatively more positive information than
negative information as compared to the full information case. The optimal information
design Ω∗0 and Ω
∗
1 are jointly determined by equation (14) and (15) (given the assumption
that the seller always sets Ω∗1 equal to δ
∗∗
1 ). In particular, lower prior belief q or higher
information processing cost λ motivates the seller to increase Ω∗0 but decrease Ω
∗
1;
2. If q ≤ q, the seller provides no information and the consumer always chooses outside
option;
3. If q ≥ q¯, the seller provides no information and the consumer always purchases the
product
Proof: See appendix.
Now I turn attention to the optimal pricing under information design. As discussed
previously, a seller would provide information only when it charges a relatively high price
p such that p > q + (1 − q)w (i.e., the prior utility EU ′ < 0). Therefore, if the seller
provides no information, then he charges a price p∗ = q + (1− q)w such that the consumer
always purchases the product without any learning. If the seller instead chooses to provide
some information, then he charges a price p > q + (1 − q)w and designs the information
environment such that the consumer is indifferent between processing information and not
processing information (and not buy the product), as shown earlier in equation (14). In
this case, the consumer always processes information and the optimal price p∗ satisfies the
following necessary condition, the first order condition of consumer maximizing the utility
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(a) Impact of prior belief on information
design (p = 0.5, λ = 1, w = −1)














(b) Impact of learning cost on informa-
tion design (p = 0.5, q = 0.6, w = −1)
Figure 14: Optimal information design under exogenous price p > q + (1− q)w
of learning with respect to δ1,
p∗ = 1− λ log
q + (1− q) Ω0
1−δ∗∗1
q + (1− q)1−Ω0
δ∗∗1
(16)
Now, according to equation (14) and (16), one can obtain the following equation (17),
which implicitly determines δ∗∗1 as a function of Ω0, denoted by δ
∗∗
1 (Ω0).
(qδ∗∗1 +(1−q)(1−Ω0))(1− λ log
q + (1− q) Ω0
1−δ∗∗1




= qδ∗∗1 +(1−q)(1−Ω0)w−λI(X,S)δ∗∗1 ,Ω0
(17)
As before, I assume the seller always sets Ω1 = δ
∗∗
1 , i.e., the seller has no incentive to
provide information more than the amount that the consumer will process. Now, based on
equation (17), one can derive the seller's profit pi as a function of Ω0, which is given by (18)
pi = qδ∗∗1 (Ω0) + (1− q)(1− Ω0)w − λI(X,S)δ∗∗1 (Ω0),Ω0 (18)
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qδ∗∗1 (Ω0) + (1− q)(1− Ω0)w − λI(X,S)δ∗∗1 (Ω0),Ω0 (19)
After obtaining the optimal Ω∗0, one can recover the optimal Ω
∗
1 from (17) and then
optimal price p∗ from (16). Although there is no closed-form solution for optimal pricing
and optimal information design, numerical analysis shows a number of interesting insights
about the pricing and information design (Figure 15). I find that on the one hand, when the
consumer's information processing cost is low, a seller is willing to invite consumers to learn
about the product match, and thus it would make some product information available for
consumers to learn. Moreover, if the consumer chooses to learn, then the seller can charge
a relatively high price, because the consumer's willingness to pay becomes higher when
receiving a positive signal. In particular, a lower information processing cost increases the
consumer's incentive to learn and thus the seller can charge a higher price. Therefore, the
optimal price decreases with the consumer's information processing cost. However, when
the consumer's information processing cost is high enough, the seller does not want the
consumer to learn, because otherwise he has to charge a very low price to invite consumers
to process information. Thus, when the consumer has a high information processing cost,
the seller would not provide any product information and instead would charge a relatively
low price p∗ = q + (1− q)w (i.e., EU ′ = 0) such that the consumer would always purchase
the product.
Furthermore, I find that a seller may charge a lower price when he can fully control the
information environment (i.e., the seller can choose Ω1 and Ω0 flexibly) than when he can
not (and full information is available to consumers), as shown in Figure 15. This is because
a lower price can increase the consumer's incentive of processing information, allowing the
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Figure 15: Price comparison between full information and information design. pfull is the
optimal price under full information and pdesign is the optimal price under information design
seller to further bias the information environment to increase the consumer's purchase like-
lihood. However, when the consumer has a very high information processing cost, the seller
wants the consumer to buy the product without processing any information. Therefore, if
the seller can design the information environment, he can eliminate the consumer's search
by simply making no information available and charging a price p∗ = q + (1 − q)w; but
if the seller has no control on the information environment and full information is always
available for the consumer, then the seller has to charge a relatively lower price to eliminate
the consumer's search, because the consumer would have a relatively higher incentive to
process information in the full information case as compared to the information design case.
Overall, when the consumer's information processing cost is low, a seller may charge a lower
price with information design than without information design, but he may charge a higher
price instead when the consumer's information processing cost is high.
Finally, in terms of optimal information design under endogenous pricing, I find that the
seller, similar to the exogenous price case, has a lower incentive to suppress negative infor-
mation in the environment, as the consumer's prior belief becomes lower. However, I find
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(a) Under high prior belief (q = 0.6, w =
−1)












(b) Under low prior belief (q = 0.4, w =
−1)
Figure 16: Optimal information design under endogenous pricing
that the consumer's information processing cost influences a seller's information design in a
more sophisticated way under the endogenous price case. Specifically, given the consumer
has a high prior belief, a higher information processing cost motivates a seller to further
decrease the proportion of negative information in the environment (i.e., the difference be-
tween Ω1 and Ω0 becomes larger, see Figure 16a), which is in contrast to the exogenous
price case above; but if the consumer has a low prior belief, then a higher information pro-
cessing cost instead forces a seller to increase the proportion of negative information (i.e.,
the difference between Ω0 and Ω1 becomes larger, see Figure 16b). To understand this,
note that as discussed earlier, the consumer's attention allocation is mainly affected by her
prior belief if the information processing cost is high. Therefore, as information processing
cost becomes higher, a consumer with a high prior belief would have a lower interest in
processing negative information, allowing the seller to decrease the proportion of negative
information in the environment; However, if the consumer has a low prior belief, then the
consumer would like to process more negative information, forcing the seller to increase the
proportion of negative information. I summarize the results from numerical analysis in the
following proposition.
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Proposition 12 Under endogenous pricing, when the consumer has a lower prior belief,
the seller has a lower incentive to suppress negative information. Furthermore, the incentive
to suppress negative information increases with consumer's information processing cost when
the consumer has a high prior belief, but the incentive would decrease with the cost when the
consumer has a low prior belief. Finally, if the information processing cost is low, the seller
may charge a lower price under information design than under no information design; if
the information processing cost is high, the seller may instead charge a higher price under
information design than under no information design.
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Chapter 5: Discussions and Conclusions
In this chapter, I first discuss the potential alternative information cost functions that
can be used in our context, and then I discuss the practical implications of this research
and how to test the proposed theory in an experimental setting. Finally, I make conclusions
about my dissertation.
5.1 Discussion about alternative information cost functions
Although our use of mutual information as the measure of information costs has found both
theoretical and empirical support as mentioned earlier, it is worth applying other meaningful
cost functions to check robustness of results obtained using the entropy based cost function.
One alternative cost function is based on the intuition that processing information also
reduces on average the variance of belief distribution. Therefore, the amount of information
contained in a signal can plausibly measured by the reduction of the variance of belief
distribution. Specifically, suppose the consumer has a prior belief that the product would
match with probability P (X = 1), then the variance of the prior belief distribution is given
by P (X = 1)(1− P (X = 1)). By processing information, the consumer receives a signal S
based on which she updates her prior belief to some posterior beliefs. If S = 1, then the
variance of her posterior belief distribution is given by P (X = 1|S = 1)(1−P (X = 1|S = 1));
if S = 0, then the variance of her posterior belief distribution is given by P (X = 1|S =
0)(1 − P (X = 1|S = 0)). Note that the expected variance of posterior belief distributions
is always weakly smaller than the variance of prior belief distribution. That is, P (S =
1)P (X = 1|S = 1)(1−P (X = 1|S = 1))+P (S = 0)P (X = 1|S = 0)(1−P (X = 1|S = 0)) ≤
P (X = 1)(1−P (X = 1)). Now, we can quantify the cost of obtaining a particular signal by
the reduction of variance of belief distribution P (X = 1)(1−P (X = 1))−{P (S = 1)P (X =
1|S = 1)(1−P (X = 1|S = 1))+P (S = 0)P (X = 1|S = 0)(1−P (X = 1|S = 0))}. Using this
variance-based metric does not lead to closed-form solution but numerical analysis shows
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(a) Case I: High q and U1 <
|U0|














(b) Case II: Low q and U1 >
|U0|












(c) Case III: High q and U1 >
|U0|














(d) Case IV: Low q and U1 <
|U0|
Figure 17: Impact of information processing cost on attention allocation under alternative
cost information (red dotted line is for δ0 and black solid line is for δ1)
that it would not change our main results qualitatively. Figure 17 shows the consumer's
attention allocation behavior under this alternative cost function, which is qualitatively
similar to the results obtained using entropy cost function (See Figure 3 in Section 3.2).
Finally, one may also come up with other appropriate ad-hoc cost functions. However,
it is important to note that the potential ad-hoc cost functions at least should satisfy two
basic properties: (1) The cost should be 0 when the signal is uninformative (i.e., δ1 +δ0 = 1);
(2) the cost function should be a function of both the signal structure and the consumer's
prior belief (that is, if the consumer is a priori more certain about the product match, then
the amount of information contained in a signal should be smaller). Given these two basic
properties, it turns out not to be an easy task to come up with an appropriate ad-hoc cost
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function. On the contrary, the entropy-based cost function that I have used is derived from
some intuitive axioms and has been widely accepted and adopted in multiple disciplines
where information processing is considered.
5.2 Discussion about practical implications and experimental test
Practical implications
In marketing, researchers have found in a variety of contexts that consumers often pay
asymmetric attention to different product information. For example, Hoch and Ha (1986)
find that advertising induces consumers to conduct confirmatory information search for the
advertised brand. The explanation given by the authors is that advertising forms a tentative
hypothesis that the product is good for the consumer, and the consumer tends to confirm
that hypothesis by searching more positive information that supports this hypothesis. In
addition, John, Scott and Bettman (1986) find that consumers tend to conduct confirma-
tory search for covariation assessment. That is, those consumers who believed that price and
quality are positively related elected to sample higher-priced products than consumers who
believed that there is little relationship between price and quality. In contrast to the previous
research, my research shows that the confirmatory search could be optimal behavior coming
out of the consumer optimizing attention to different types of information. Therefore, it of-
fers a rational explanation for consumer confirmatory search, which is complementary to the
psychological explanations proposed in the previous research. More importantly, I further
characterize the conditions under which confirmatory search and disconfirmatory search are
optimal respectively. This deepens our understanding and provides some new predictions
on consumer information search behavior that can be tested empirically or experimentally
(In the next section, I propose a basic idea about experimental testing of these theoretical
predictions.).
In addition to consumer information search, this research also sheds light on firm strate-
gies. For example, I show that when the consumer wants to search information about
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product match, lowering the search cost could decrease the consumer's price sensitivity, al-
lowing the seller to charge a higher price. This may explain why some online retailers tend
to make the product information search on their websites as easy as possible. For instance,
when a consumer is searching hotels on Booking.com and is browsing the product page for
a particular hotel, the website automatically analyzes all of the previous customer reviews
written for this hotel and offers an overview of the hotel features frequently mentioned in
the customer reviews. Plausibly, this practice may decrease the consumer's search cost by
allowing the consumer to obtain the most important product information in an easier way.
Therefore, according to the discussion in Chapter 4, this practice can decrease the con-
sumer's price sensitivity and allows the sellers to charge a higher price, which also benefits
the online retailer.
Furthermore, my research also shows that when the consumer has a high information
processing cost, the seller may want to charge a relatively low price, inducing the consumer
to buy the product without any learning. Some observations suggest that this type of
pricing strategy may also be used in practice. For example, when booking a flight on
a website such as Expedia.com, consumers are often pitched at the stage of payment with
some add-on products, such as insurance, pick-up services or hotels. Plausibly, the consumer
may not want to further search the product information for these add-on products at the
stage of payment, perhaps because searching the flights has already consumed a lot of the
consumer's mental resources and time. In other words, the consumer has a high information
processing cost for searching information on these add-on products. Given this, my research
may explain the cursory observation that the website tends to pitch the consumers with
relatively cheap add-on products among the alternatives. The reason is that pitching with a
cheap add-on product is more likely to induce the consumers who have a high information
processing cost to buy the add-on immediately without further learning.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, firms can also design the information environment
to increase the consumer's purchase likelihood. For example, a seller can choose how much
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information and which information to be available in the advertising or on the product page.
Intuitively, a seller has an inherent motivation to induce the consumer to pay more atten-
tion to positive information of the product and pay less attention to negative information.
Therefore, the seller may want to suppress the negative product reviews on the reviews
sites or does not disclose the information of some certain product attributes which may
dissatisfy consumers with high probability. Furthermore, when designing the information
environment, the seller may take into account the consumer attention allocation behavior
because consumers often pay asymmetric attention to different types of information with
some information being totally ignored. In my research, I find that when the information
processing cost is high for consumers, the information environment designed by the seller is
quite asymmetric (i.e., disproportionately more positive information under high prior belief
and disproportionately more negative information under low prior belief). One may observe
this phenomenon or test this prediction in the context where an online seller designs both the
mobile store and the desktop store. In this context, if on average consumers have a higher
information processing cost when visiting the mobile store than when visiting the desktop
store, then we may observe that the seller provides less information in a more asymmetric
way in his mobile store than in the desktop store.
Moreover, I also find that the seller may charge a lower price when he can control the
information environment than when he can not. This may offer a new explanation for the
observation that some new products (e.g., a new restaurant, a new education program,
etc.) tend to charge a lower price (e.g., offer price discount) in the beginning than in the
later periods.6 Specifically, in the beginning, it is relatively easy for the seller to control
the information environment by advertising or by the salesman's efforts to persuade the
consumers to purchase the product. In later periods, the seller may lose the control of
the information environment. For instance, more customer reviews may become available in
6An alternative explanation is that charging a lower price can invite more consumers to try the product
in the early periods, which can grow the brand awareness more quickly.
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reviews sites and thus the potential consumers can obtain information from the reviews sites,
decreasing the seller's capability of influencing the information environment. Therefore,
according to the discussion in Section 4.3, the seller has the incentive to charge a lower price
in the early periods to increase the consumer's learning incentive. This increases the seller's
capability of persuading the consumer to purchase the product by information design, which
increases the consumer's purchase likelihood.
To further examine the theoretical implications made in my research, I propose a basic
idea in the following about testing consumer attention allocation behavior and the seller
behavior in an experimental environemnt.
Experimental testing
One way to test the theoretical implications in my research is to simulate an online shopping
environment in the experiment where a typical product page includes both overall rating for
the product and specific product reviews. Specifically, in the experiment, the subjects are
asked to make a purchase decision for a certain product which is actually sold on an online
retailer such as Amazon (e.g., a mug or a computer mouse). Before making a purchase
decision, the subject can read the overall rating and specific product reviews about this
product on the product page. If she decides to purchase, then she will get this product with
some probability; if she decides not to buy, then she can participate in a lottery and win a
certain amount of money with some probability, which serves as an outside option for the
subject.7 Note that we can elicit two conditions for product utilities: (1) Large expected
gain from the lottery (i.e., the utility of outside option is high), and (2) small expected gain
from the lottery (i.e., the utility of outside option is low). Under the first condition, the
gain of buying a matched product is relatively small as compared to the loss of buying an
unmatched product; Under the second condition, the gain of buying a matched product is
7Depending on the research budget and the product category, we can make the outside option to be
either stochastic or deterministic.
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relatively large as compared to the loss of buying an unmatched product.
Next, in terms of prior belief, it is reasonable to assume that the consumer's prior belief
is mainly influenced by the overall rating of the product. That is, a high overall rating elicits
a high prior belief , while a low overall rating elicits a low prior belief. To better elicit the
prior belief, the section for specific product reviews can be initially folded on the product
page and the subject needs to click to unfold the product reviews section. In other words,
the product page initially contains only the overall rating and relevant product description,
which is assumed to form the subject's prior belief. Then, if the subject chooses to unfold
the product reviews section, the specific product reviews would appear on the product page.
Furthermore, to influence the consumer's information processing cost, we can design at
least two conditions: (1) The subject is given enough time to make a purchase decision;
(2) the subject must make a purchase decision in a short period of time. The idea is
that the consumer's information processing cost would be influenced by the time pressure.
Plausibly, under the first condition, the subject's information processing cost would be low;
however, under the second condition, the subject's information processing cost would be
high. Another way to influence the consumer's information processing cost is to manipulate
the subject's mental resources by asking the subjects to memorize and recall a sequence of
numbers before and after the main task, which is typically used in psychology literature.
Given the manipulation of the subject's prior belief, product utilities, and the infor-
mation processing cost, we can track the subject's attention on those product reviews by
monitoring his or her eye-movement using eye-tracking devices or monitoring the mouse-
clicking activities. Therefore, the amount of attention paid to positive reviews and negative
reviews can be measured by the amount of time spent on each type of reviews respectively.
The basic experiment roughly discussed above can be used to test the theoretical impli-
cations derived in my dissertation. First, as I mentioned earlier, when the consumer has a
higher prior belief about product fit, she would have a higher incentive to avoid the mis-
take of not buying a good product when the product indeed matches her needs, and thus
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she would pay relatively more attention to positive information than negative information.
Therefore, we have the following testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. If the product has a higher overall rating, the subjects would pay relatively
more attention to positive reviews than negative ones, and vice versa.
Furthermore, one of the main results on consumer attention is that the consumer would
do more confirmatory search under a high information processing cost and may do more
disconfirmatory search under a low information processing cost. This leads to the following
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a. If the product has a high overall rating, then the subjects in the high
information processing cost condition would pay relatively more attention to positive reviews
and less attention to negative reviews than those subjects in the low information processing
cost condition;
Hypothesis 2b. If the product has a low overall rating, then the subjects in the high
information processing cost condition would pay relatively more attention to negative reviews
and less attention to positive reviews than those subjects in the low information processing
cost condition.
Hypothesis 3a. If the product has a high overall rating and the utility of outside
option is large, then the subjects in the high information processing cost condition would pay
relatively more attention to positive reviews than negative reviews (i.e., confirmatory search),
while the subjects in the low information processing cost condition would pay relatively more
attention to negative reviews than positive reviews (i.e., disconfirmatory search).
Hypothesis 3b. If the product has a low overall rating and the utility of outside option
is low, then the subjects in the high information processing cost condition would pay relatively
more attention to negative reviews than positive reviews (i.e., confirmatory search), while the
subjects in the low information processing cost condition would pay relatively more attention
to positive reviews than negative reviews (i.e., disconfirmatory search).
Regarding the firm strategies, to introduce the price factor into the purchase decision, we
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can endow the subjects with a certain amount of virtual money at the beginning which can
be used to purchase the product or to participate in the lottery (outside option). The idea
is that if the subject spends some portion of virtual money on purchasing the product, then
the remaining money can be used to play the lottery (more remaining money means higher
stake in the lottery). By doing so, we can elicit the impact of product price on consumer's
purchase decision. Note that in the experiment, the subjects would see the price on the
product page all the time since the very beginning. According to the discussion in Chapter
4, we have the following hypotheses to test on firm strategies.
Hypothesis 4. A higher product price would induce subjects to pay more attention to
negative reviews and less attention to positive reviews. This impact of a higher price on
attention is stronger for the subjects under high information processing cost condition than
for the subjects under low information processing cost condition.
Note that if the experimental results support the above Hypothesis 4, then it would
further lend support to the implication that a higher information processing cost can increase
the consumer's price sensitivity and thus force the firm to charge a lower price. Next, to
examine the implications on firm information design, we can extend our above experiment by
dividing the subjects into two groups: Consumers and sellers. The basic idea is the following:
we first allow the sellers to decide on the product price and also choose which product
reviews to show on the product page (the researcher first selects the real product reviews
for the product on Amazon and then asks the sellers in the experiment to choose which
product reviews to show on the simulated product page.). As in the previous experiment,
the consumers in the experiment are endowed with a certain amount of virtual money
at the beginning which can be used to purchase a product or to participate in the lottery
(outside option) if he or she decides not to purchase a product. A seller's goal is to obtain
as much virtual money as possible (i.e., maximize the profit) from the consumers, and then
the seller can use such money to play lottery afterwards.). Note that a seller is randomly
assigned with a product from the sample and the seller understands the consumer's situation
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and knows that there would be a bunch of consumers visiting the product page and there is
no competition between sellers. With this proposed experiment, we can test the following
hypotheses on firm information design and pricing.
Hypothesis 5. If the seller is assigned to a product with a lower overall rating, then
the seller would increase the proportion of negative product reviews in the environment.
Hypothesis 6. The seller would charge a lower price if the seller can choose which
product reviews are available for consumers to process than if the seller can not.
Note that to test Hypothesis 6, the sellers in the experiment are randomly assigned to
either the condition where they can choose the product reviews on the product page or
the condition where they can not. The discussions above only give a basic idea about the
experimental tests of theoretical implications obtained in my model and more details about
the experiment are needed to be figured out in the future.
5.3 Conclusions
Facing massive amounts of product information, consumers often have to incur nontrivial
costs including time and mental efforts to process information. Therefore, they often need to
make choices regarding the subjects to which they pay more or less attention. In this paper,
I have studied several questions related to consumer attention allocation: How would a con-
sumer optimize attention to various product information before making a purchase decision?
How is this attention allocation decision influenced by some interesting factors such as the
consumer's prior belief, information processing cost, and the credibility of information? How
does the seller design the marketing strategies taking into account the consumer's attention
allocation? To answer these questions, I build an analytical model in which a consumer's
attention allocation decision is captured by her choice of signal structure and she chooses
the optimal signal structure by trading off the value and cost of information, where the cost
of information is measured using information theory (Shannon 1948).
My research sheds new lights on consumer information search behavior and provides in-
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teresting implications for marketing strategies. Specifically, I find that a consumer conducts
either confirmatory search or disconfirmatory search. In particular, a consumer may engage
in more disconfirmatory search when she has a low information processing cost but engage
in more confirmatory search when she has a high cost. This result suggests that the confir-
matory bias behavior widely studied in psychology literature could be an optimal behavior
coming out of people optimizing attention to different types of information, especially when
people has high cognitive limitations and thus high information processing costs. Next,
I find that the consumer's purchase likelihood may vary with her information processing
cost in a non-monotonic way, depending on the consumer's prior belief and the utilities of
buying a matched and mismatched product. Moreover, I show that when more information
becomes available or credible, the consumer would increase attention to negative informa-
tion when the prior utility of the product is high but she would increase attention to positive
information when the prior utility is low.
In terms of firm strategies, I find that under a low information processing cost, the seller
would charge a relatively high price such that consumers always process information; but
under a high information processing cost, the seller would charge a relatively low price such
that consumers purchase the product without any learning. The optimal price and profit
would first decrease and then increase in consumer's information processing cost. Further-
more, offering the return policy induces the consumer to pay more attention to positive
information and less attention to negative information, and the seller would offer such re-
turn policy except when the consumer has a very high information processing cost. Finally,
when a seller can influence the information environment, he would have a lower incentive to
suppress the negative information when the consumer has a lower prior belief about product
fit. Besides, a higher information processing cost for a consumer would increase or decrease
a seller's incentive to suppress the negative information in the environment, depending on
whether the seller can adjust the product price and whether the consumer has a high or low
prior belief. Interestingly, the seller may charge a lower price when he can fully control the
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information environment than when he can not.
Future research could extend current work by examining how the consumer's attention
allocation influences the competition among many sellers. Intuitively, suppose a consumer
is deciding which one among several alternatives better fits her. When the information
processing cost is low, the consumer has a high incentive to process information and there
may exist an equilibrium where the firms charge prices such that the consumer always
processes information. In particular, as the information processing cost becomes higher but
not too high, the demand sensitivity to price becomes higher as discussed earlier and thus
the price competition may become more severe.
Furthermore, although Shannon mutual information has been widely adopted theoret-
ically and empirically in the literature as the measure of information processing cost, it
would be interesting to understand and account for systematic deviations in consumers' in-
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Proof of Proposition 1
The consumer solves the following optimization problem.
EU∗ ≡ sup
0≤δ1≤1,0≤δ0≤1
P (S = 1)[P (X = 1|S = 1)U1 + P (X = 0|S = 1)U0 ]− λI(X,S)
s.t. δ1 + δ0 > 1
where
I(X,S) = −[qδ1 + (1− q)(1− δ0)] log[qδ1 + (1− q)(1− δ0)]
−[q(1− δ1) + (1− q)δ0] log[q(1− δ1) + (1− q)δ0]
+q[δ1 log δ1 + (1− δ1) log(1− δ1)]
+(1− q)[δ0 log δ0 + (1− δ0) log(1− δ0)]
Note that the objective function is strictly concave function and thus the first order condition
is sufficient for finding the unique global optimal solution.I first ignore the constraints (i.e.,
0 ≤ δ1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ δ0 ≤ 1, δ1 + δ0 > 1). The first-order conditions with respect to δ1 and δ0




q + (1− q) δ0
1−δ1





1− q + q δ1
1−δ0
1− q + q 1−δ1
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, the utility of outside
option, 0, is larger than EU∗ and prior utility EU0 ≡ qU1 + (1 − q)U0. Therefore, the







the prior utility EU0 ≡ qU1 + (1− q)U0 is larger than EU∗ and the utility of outside option.
Therefore, the consumer processes no information and purchases the product. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2







































1)(1− e−U1λ ). Now denote H1 ≡ 1−qq (e
−U0
λ − 1)(1− eU0λ ) and H0 ≡ q1−q (e
U1
λ − 1)(1− e−U1λ ).
It is not hard to check that both H1 and H0 decrease with λ. In particular, H1 → 0 and






























(i.e., U1 > −U0). According to the above properties of
H1 and H0, it is not hard to prove that there must exist a unique solution, λ
∗, of equation
H1 = H0, and for λ ∈ (0, λ∗), H1 < H0 and thus δ∗1 > δ∗0; for λ ∈ (λ∗,∞), H1 > H0 and
thus δ∗1 < δ
∗













. It is easy
to check that q¯ decreases with λ and q increases with λ. In particular, as λ → 0, q → 0
and q¯ → 1; as λ → ∞, q → −U0
U1−U0 and q¯ → −U0U1−U0 . Now if q > −U0U1−U0 , then denote λ¯ as






. Note that if 0 < λ < λ¯, then the consumer
would process information and the attention allocation strategy is given by δ∗1 and δ
∗
0 in
proposition 1; if λ > λ¯, then the consumer would not process information and would always
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buy the product. In the following, I will prove that λ¯ < λ∗ for q > −U0
U1−U0 and λ¯ > λ
∗ for
q < −U0
U1−U0 . To see this, I first consider the scenario where q >
−U0
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1−q¯ (e
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1− q¯ (e
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λ¯ − 1)(1− e−U1λ¯ )
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< 0 < −U0
λ¯

















λ¯ − 1)(1 − eU0λ¯ ) ≤ q¯
1−q¯ (e
U1
λ¯ − 1)(1 − e−U1λ¯ ). This
implies that at λ = λ¯, H1 < H0 and according to the properties ofH1 andH0, it must be that
λ¯ < λ∗ and thus H1 < H0 (i.e., δ∗1 > δ
∗
0) for any λ < λ¯. Next, consider the scenario where
q < −U0















λ¯ − 1)(1− eU0λ¯ ) > q
1− q (e
U1
λ¯ − 1)(1− e−U1λ¯ )




λ¯ − 1)(1− e−U1λ¯ )



















λ¯ − 1)(1− e−U1λ¯ )
↔ e−U0λ¯ > e−U1λ¯
Note that since −U1
λ¯
< 0 < −U0
λ¯










1)(1− eU0λ¯ ) > q
1−q (e
U1
λ¯ − 1)(1− e−U1λ¯ ). This implies that at λ = λ¯, H1 > H0 (i.e., δ∗1 < δ∗0),
and according to the properties of H1 and H0, it must be that λ¯ > λ
∗. Therefore, for
0 < λ < λ∗, H1 < H0 (i.e., δ∗1 > δ
∗
0); for λ
∗ < λ < λ¯, H1 > H0 (i.e., δ∗1 < δ
∗
0).




(i.e., U1 < −U0). Q.E.D.
Proof Proposition 3








































1−q > ∆, then
dP (S=1)
dλ
> 0; otherwise, if q




Now, it is not hard to see that ∆ → −U0
U1
as λ → ∞. Furthermore, if U1 > (<)|U0|, then
∆ increases (decreases) with λ. Thus, given U1 > |U0|, if q1−q > −U0U1 (i.e., q > −U0U1−U0 ),
then it must always be that q
1−q > ∆, which implies
dP (S=1)
dλ






U1−U0 ), there exists λˆ such that for λ < λˆ,
dP (S=1)
dλ
> 0 and for λ > (=)λˆ, dP (S=1)
dλ
< (=)0
(λˆ is the unique solution of q
1−q = ∆). On the other hand, given U1 < |U0|, if q1−q < −U0U1
(i.e., q < −U0
U1−U0 ), then it must always be that
q
1−q < ∆, which implies
dP (S=1)
dλ






(i.e., q > −U0
U1−U0 ), then there exists λˆ such that for λ < λˆ,
dP (S=1)
dλ
< 0 and for
λ > (=)λˆ, dP (S=1)
dλ
> (=)0 (λˆ is the unique solution of q
1−q = ∆.). Q.E.D.
Proof for Proposition 4
SinceP (X = 1) = P (X = 0) = 1
2




(1− α) = 1
2
.








[δ1 log δ1 + (1− δ1) log(1− δ1)] + 12 [δ0 log δ0 + (1− δ0) log(1− δ0)]}.
The optimal information processing for consumer is given as follows
EU∗ ≡ sup
δ1,δ0
P (S = 1)[P (Y = 1|S = 1)U1 + P (Y = 0|S = 1)U0 ]− λ[H(S)−H(S|X)]
s.t. δ1 + δ0 > 1




[αδ1 + (1−α)(1− δ0)]U1 + 12 [(1−α)δ1 +α(1− δ0)]U0−λ[H(S)−H(S|X)]
s.t. δ1 + δ0 > 1
I first ignore the constraint δ1 + δ0 > 1. The first-order conditions with respect to δ1 and























Denote h ≡ ∆
1−∆ . Note that 0 < δ
∗
1 < 1 and 0 < δ
∗
0 < 1 if and only if 0 < h < ∞. Now





















→ h = 1 + 2(1− e
k)
2ek − (el + el′) , (21)
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Where k ≡ U1+U0
λ
, l ≡ αU1+(1−α)U0
λ
and l′ ≡ (1−α)U1+αU0
λ
.
Note that because of our assumptions (i.e., 1 ≥ α > 1
2
, U1 > 0 and U0 < 0) , e
l is an
increasing function of α and el ≥ e k2 .
(1) When U1 + U0 ≥ 0, it is easy to see that if ∞ > h > 0, then h is a decreasing
function of el and thus a decreasing function of α. Furthermore, according to (21), the
necessary and sufficient condition for ∞ > h > 0 is that el > ek +√e2k − ek. Therefore, for
1 ≥ α > α∗ = λlog(ek+
√
e2k−ek)−U0







where h is given in (21).
Note that for 1
2
< α ≤ α∗, the prior utility EU0 = 12U1 + 12U0 is larger than max{EU∗, 0}.
Therefore, the consumer processes no information and purchases the product.
(2) When U1 + U0 < 0, it is easy to see that if ∞ > h > 0, then h is an increasing
function of el and thus an increasing function of α. Furthermore, according to (21), the
necessary and sufficient condition for ∞ > h > 0 is that el > 1 +√1− ek. Therefore, for
1 ≥ α > α′ = λlog(1+
√
1−ek)−U0







where h is given in (21).
Note that for 1
2
< α ≤ α′, the utility of outside option, 0, is larger than max{EU0, EU∗}.
Therefore, the consumer processes no information and chooses the outside option. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5
According to proof of Proposition 2,
(1) When U1 + U0 > 0, for 1 ≥ α > α∗, ∞ > h > 0 and h is a decreasing function of
el and thus a decreasing function of α. Therefore, the probability of purchasing, P (S =
1) = ∆ = h
1+h




increasing with α. To see the effect of α on δ∗1, first denote n = e


































)] + 2(1 − m)(n − m
n
). One can show that if G(n(α = 1)) > 0, then δ∗1 first decreases
with α for α∗ < α < α∗∗ and then increases with α for α∗∗ < α ≤ 1, where α∗∗satisfies
G(n(α = α∗∗)) = 0; if G(n(α = 1)) ≤ 0, then δ∗1 always decreases with α for α∗ < α ≤ 1.
(2) When U1 + U0 < 0, for 1 ≥ α > α′ , ∞ > h > 0 and h is an increasing function of el
and thus an increasing function of α. Therefore, the probability of purchasing, P (S = 1) =
∆ = h
1+h
, is increasing with α. It is also easy to see δ∗1 =
elh
1+elh
is increasing with α. For the





































) − 2m] + 2(1 −m)(n − m
n
). One can
show that if G∗(n(α = 1)) < 0, then δ∗0 decreases with α for α
′
< α < α′′and increases with
α for α′′ < α ≤ 1, where α′′ satisfies G∗(n(α = α′′)) = 0; if G∗(n(α = 1)) ≥ 0, then δ∗0
decreases with α for α∗ < α ≤ 1.







and P (S = 1) = 1
2
. So both δ∗1 and δ
∗
0 increase
with α, while the purchase probability does not vary with α. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 6
The consumer solves the following optimization problem:
EU∗ ≡sup
δ1,δ0
P (S = 1)[P (X = 1|S = 1)(1 + w − p) + P (X = 0|S = 1)(1− p)]− λI(X,S)
s.t. δ1 + δ0 > 1
where I(X,S) is given in (5). We first ignore the constraint δ1 + δ0 > 1. The first-order















Solving this, we obtain δ∗1 and δ
∗
0 as in (10). With the definitions l =
p−1
λ
and k = w
λ
(as in the
main text), one can easily check that when 1−λ log(1−q+qe−k) < p < 1+λ log(1−q+qek),
0 < δ∗1 < 1, 0 < δ
∗




1−ek−l . Since l increases with p, it is easy to
see that δ∗1 decreases with p, while δ
∗
0 increases with p. When p ≥ 1 +λ log(1− q+ qek), the
utility of outside option, 0, is larger than both EU∗ and prior utility EU0 ≡ qU1 +(1−q)U0.
Therefore, the consumer processes no information and chooses the outside option. When
p ≤ 1− λ log(1− q + qe−k), the prior utility EU0 is larger than EU∗and K. Therefore, the
consumer processes no information and purchases the product. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7





















. Note that the function
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Proof of Proposition 11




, then the consumer would not process
information and would always choose her outside option, even when full information is
available. Therefore, the seller has no incentive to provide information. Next, given p >
q + (1 − q)w, only when q < q < q¯ ≡ p−w
1−w (note that p > q + (1 − q)w leads to q < p−w1−w
), the consumer would process information, becauseEU∗ > 0 according to Proposition 1.
In this case, as discussed earlier, the seller would choose the information design such that
the optimal signal structure δ∗∗1 and δ
∗∗









1 < 1, and the consumer is indifferent between processing information and choosing
her outside option without processing any information, given by equation (14).














































= δ∗∗1 (1− p)− (1− Ω∗0)(w − p)
− λ{−(δ∗∗1 + Ω∗0 − 1) log(qδ∗∗1 + (1− q)(1− Ω∗0))
+ (δ∗∗1 + Ω
∗




= λ(δ∗∗1 + Ω
∗
0 − 1)2( 1q(1−δ∗∗1 )+(1−q)Ω∗0 +
1




≤ 0 at q satisfying EU∗design(δ∗∗1 (q),Ω∗0(q), q) = 0, then for any qˆ satisfying




0(qˆ), qˆ) > 0. Next, for any q satisfying q < q < q¯ ≡
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p−w
1−w , denote the maximal utility of learning under full information as EU
∗(q). It must be




0(q), q), because information design decreases the utility of
learning. Furthermore, from Proposition 1, I know that if q → q, then the maximal utility of
learning under full information EU∗(q)→ 0, which implies that EU∗design(δ∗∗1 (q),Ω∗0(q), q)→
0 as q → q. However, this contradicts with EU∗design(δ∗∗1 (qˆ),Ω∗0(qˆ), qˆ) > 0 for any qˆ satisfying
q < qˆ < q. So it must be that
∂EU∗design
∂q








< 0. Finally, according to equation (15), the right hand side of equation (15)
decreases with q and increases with Ω∗0. Thus, I must have
dδ∗∗1
dq
> 0. In a word, lowerprior
belief q motivates the seller to increase Ω∗0 but decrease Ω
∗
1.
Similarly, in terms of the impact of λ on information design. Differentiating equation






















> 0 at δ0 = Ω
∗




> 0. Next, according to equation (15), as λ increases, the left hand side of equation
(15) decreases, and since
dΩ∗0
dλ
> 0, it must be that
dδ∗∗1
dλ
< 0 (and thus
dΩ∗1
dλ
< 0 under the
assumption that a seller always sets Ω∗1 = δ
∗∗
1 ). Therefore, higher information processing
cost λ motivates the seller to increase Ω∗0 but decrease Ω
∗
1. Q.E.D.
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